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THE DIRKSEN AMENDMENT AND THE 
ARTICLE V CONVENTION PROCESS 
Arthur Earl Bonfield* 
THE PROBLEM 
O N March 18, 1967, the New York Times announced that "[a] campaign for a constitutional convention to modify the Su-
preme Court's "one man-one vote" rule is nearing success. It would 
be the first such Convention since the Constitution was drafted in 
Philadelphia in 1787."1 The newspaper report went on to note that 
as of that date, thirty-two states had formally requested Congress to 
convene a federal constitutional convention for the purpose of pro-
posing amendments to our fundamental law on the subject of state 
legislative apportionment. Since article V of the United States 
Constitution provides that "on the Application of the Legislatures 
of two-thirds of the several states [Congress] shall call a Convention 
for proposing amendments," the article concluded that the pro-
ponents of the convention "lack only two states in their drive" to 
assemble such a body. 
The target of this convention drive is the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims2 which held "that, as a 
basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires 
that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be 
apportioned on a population basis."3 Forces led by Senator Everett 
Dirksen hope to amend the Constitution so that the several states can 
apportion one house of their bicameral legislatures on some basis 
other than population. After an attempt to induce Congress to pro-
pose such an amendment failed for want of the requisite two-thirds 
vote, Senator Dirksen, bolstered by earlier similar efforts of the 
Council of State Governments, 4 concentrated his efforts on the con-
vention approach to proposing constitutional amendments.5 As the 
New York Times story of March 18 stated, "[m]ost of official Wash-
• Professor of Law, University of Iowa Law School. B.A. 1956, Brooklyn College; 
LL.B. 1960, LL.M. 1961, Yale University.-Ed. 
1. Graham, Efforts To .&mend The Constitution On Districts Gain, N.Y. Times, 
March 18, 1967, at 1, col. 6. 
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
3. Id. at 568. 
4. Amending the Constitution To Strengthen the States in the Federal System, 36 
STATE Gov'T 10 (1963). See Oberst, The Genesis of the Three States-Rights Amend-
ments of 196J, 39 NOTRE DAME LAw. 644 (1964). 
5. Graham, supra note 1. 
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ington [was] caught by surprise because the state legislative actions 
[in attempting to summon a convention for this purpose] have been 
taken with little fanfare." 
Within a week of this revelation congressional forces favoring 
the reapportionment decisions reacted, especially "to Senator . . . 
Dirksen's assertion ... that two more legislatures would soon pass 
similar [convention call] resolutions, thus confronting Congress with 
the required 34."6 Senator Joseph Tydings, in a speech to the United 
States Senate, suggested that the effort to convene a constitutional 
convention as a means of proposing the Dirksen legislative appor-
tionment amendment should not succeed.7 He asserted that even if 
two more states joined the thirty-two that had recently requested 
such a convention, Congress could not properly call one, because 
the tendered applications of those states were improper. Senator 
Dirksen disagrees.8 Since no additional state legislatures have ten-
dered resolutions requesting such a convention, Congress has not 
yet been forced to resolve the many legal issues involved. It may, 
however, have to do so in the near future. With this in mind, Senator 
Sam Ervin recently introduced a bill into the Congress which would 
"provide procedures for calling constitutional conventions for pro-
posing amendments to the Constitution of the United States."0 
This article will concentrate on the legal issues facing Congress 
in the current effort to call a constitutional convention. Because all 
of the previous amendments to the Constitution were proposed to 
the states by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress, the issues 
raised in the present situation have never been resolved. The appro-
priate course of action for the national legislature is especially in 
doubt. An attempt will therefore be made here to focus on proper 
decision-making by Congress in resolving these constitutional issues. 
The role of the judiciary will be considered only incidentally, since, 
as will be seen, the primary obligation to decide questions raised in 
the amending process rests with Congress. It is also possible that the 
final dispositive power on this subject rests effectively in Congress 
because the courts may consider all or most of the issues raised in 
the amending process nonjusticiable political questions.10 Neverthe-
6. Graham, Amendment Drive Meets Challenge, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1967, at 
19, col. 4. 
7. 113 CoNG, R.Ec. S.4231-43 (daily ed. March 22, 1967). 
8. 113 CONG. REc. S.5460-65 (daily ed. April 19, 1967). 
9. S. 2307 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Hearings were subsequently held on this bill. 
10. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457 (1939) (concurring opinion); Dowling, 
Clarijying the Amending Process, I WASH. &: LEE L. R.Ev. 215 (1940). On the justicia-
bility 9J q_uestions arising in the amending process, see generally C. BIUCKFlELD, STAFF 
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less, "in the exercise of that power, Congress . . . is [ still] governed 
by the Constitution.''11 The following discussion of constitutional 
principles should, therefore, be considered as an appropriate guide 
for consideration by Congress when that body undertakes to per-
form its obligations respecting an article V convention.12 
I. THE APPLICATIONS BY THE STATES 
A. Article V Applications as Prerequisites for a Convention Call 
Congress is neither authorized nor compelled to summon an 
article V convention prior to the submission by two-thirds of the 
state legislatures of proper and timely applications for such a con-
vention. The reasons for this are several. Since the United States is a 
government of delegated powers, it possesses no authority except that 
conferred upon it by the Constitution. Article V, the only provision 
in the Constitution dealing with its amendment, must therefore be 
deemed exhaustive and not merely illustrative of the federal gov-
ernment's powers in this regard. That provision explicitly sets out 
two modes for proposing constitutional amendments, only one of 
which contemplates the convening of a convention empowered to 
propose amendments. Such a "Convention" is authorized by article 
V only when two-thirds of the state legislatures have made "Applica-
tions" for a convention. As a result, applications within the meaning 
of article V from two-thirds of the state legislatures must fairly be 
deemed absolute prerequisites to the summoning of such a body.13 
OF HOUSE COMM. ON nu: JUDICIARY, 85TII CONG., lsr SESS., PROBLEMS RELATING TO A 
FEDERAL CoNsrlTUTIONAL CONVENTION 27-28, 40-43 (Comm. Print 1957); L. ORFIELD, 
AMENDING nu: FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 7-36 (1942); Clark, The Supreme Court and the 
Amending Process, 39 VA. L. REv. 621 (1953); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Po-
litical Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 587-89 (1966); Note, Propos-
ing Amendments to the United States Constitution by Convention, 70 HARv. L. REv. 
1067 (1957). 
11. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457 (1939). 
12. U.S. CoNsr. art. V provides: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as 
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the 
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress. 
13. See ORFIELD, supra note 10, at 40; Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article 
V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957, 962-64 (1963); Corwin &: Ramsey, The 
Constitutional Law of Constitutional Amendment, 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 185, 196 
(1951). An analogy is to be found in those state constitutions which require a specific 
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If these applications were not prerequisites, a majority of Congress, 
on its mm say-so, could validly summon such a body and deter-
mine its make-up and mode of operation.14 Thus, it could pro-
vide that the convention be able to propose amendments to the 
states by a mere majority of its delegates. But article V insists that a 
two-thirds vote be required by both houses of Congress, or that two-
thirds of the state legislatures make application for a convention, 
before an amendment to the Constitution may be proposed to the 
states. This reflects the conviction of the Founding Fathers that the 
seriousness of this kind of action demands a national consensus. 
Permitting a simple majority of Congress to call a convention em-
powered to propose constitutional amendments approved by a 
simple majority of delegates would, therefore, frustrate the well-
reasoned intentions of the Constitution's drafters: the particularly 
high degree of consensus contemplated would no longer be required 
at any point to trigger the amending process. 
Another reason supports the view that valid article V applica-
tions are an absolute precondition to a convention call: "[A] high 
degree of adherence to exact form . . . is desirable in this ultimate 
legitimating process."15 Because of the uniquely fundamental nature 
of a constitutional amendment, attempts to alter our Constitution 
should not be filled with questionable procedures which could 
reasonably cast doubt on the ultimate validity of the provision pro-
duced. The procedure followed in any effort to amend the Constitu-
tion should be so perfect that it renders unequivocal to all reason-
able men the binding nature of the product. Consequently, there 
must be a firm and unyielding adherence to the precise procedures 
of article V. This unusual need for certainty in amending our funda-
mental law also lends additional force to the assumption that the 
precise procedures provided in article V must be deemed exclusive. 
B. Sufficiency of the State Resolutions: Their Form 
The current applications for a convention must, therefore, be 
carefully scrutinized in order to determine their adequacy for pur-
mandate at the polls before the legislature can call a state constitutional convention. 
See IowA CoNST. art. X, § 3; NEv. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § I; 
S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, § 2: TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
14. The terms of article V in no way suggest that Congress may not convene such 
a body by the usual vote required for congressional action. Consequently, no more 
than a majority vote would seem to be required to "call a Convention" or to establish 
its procedures. See Forkosch, The Alternative A.mending Clause in Article V: Reflec-
tions and Suggestions, 51 MINN. L. REv. 1053, 1067 (1967). 
15. Black, supra note 13, at 963. 
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poses of article V. I£ the state legislative resolutions are not applica-
tions for a convention within the meaning of article V, Congress 
would neither be authorized nor obligated to call a convention pur-
suant thereto. 
Twenty-nine of the thirty-two resolutions requesting a federal 
constitutional convention are identical, or nearly so, as to the nature 
of the convention they seek from Congress. Their language follows 
the model application sponsored by the Council of State Govern-
ments and in almost every case provides "that this Legislature 
respectfully petitions the Congress of the United States to call a 
convention for the purpose of proposing the following article [set 
out below] as an amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States."16 The three other states adopted resolutions which apply 
for a convention in order to propose to the states an amendment, the 
text of which is not stipulated, that would obtain a specified result.17 
In the initial version of his bill, Senator Ervin seemed to believe that 
both of these kinds of applications are proper for article V purposes. 
Thus, he took the view that the states may petition for a convention 
solely to propose or refrain from proposing specific preselected 
amendments to the Constitution. The original bill provided that a 
state application would be sufficient if it petitioned "the Congress 
stating, in substance, that the legislature requests the calling of a 
convention for the purpose of proposing one or more amendments 
[of a particular nature] to the Constitution of the United States and 
stating the [specific] nature of the amendment or amendments to be 
proposed."18 The bill now proposed by Senator Ervin deletes the 
bracketed language. It may be hoped that these deletions indicate an 
awareness that, as will hereafter be demonstrated, the current applica-
tions do not qualify under article V. 
The amending article of the Constitution clearly specifies that 
Congress "shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments." The 
process of proposing amendments would seem to contemplate a con-
scious weighing and evaluation of various alternative solutions to the 
16. Amending the Constitution To Strengthen the States in the Federal System, 
supra note 4, at 11-14. See also 113 CONG. REc. S.4232-33 (daily ed. March 22, 1967); 
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, SPECIAL ANALYSIS, A CONVENTION To AMEND THE CON· 
STITUTION? 11-16 (1967); E. YADLOSKY, STATE PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS TO CONGRESS ON 
THE SUBJECT OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SER• 
VICE REPORT JK140C32/205R (to Aug. 5, 1965). 
17. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 12, 16. 
18. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1967) (original bill); for the amended version 
of S. 2307, see appx. to Senator Ervin's article in this symposium, 66 MICH. L. REv. 
896 (1968) [hereinafter cited as amended bill, Ervin appx.]. 
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problems perceived. In this connection the following should be 
noted: 
The process of "proposal" by Congress, contained in the first alterna-
tive of Article V, obviously [and necessarily] includes the process of 
plenary deliberation upon the whole problem to which the amend-
ment is to address itself. It entails choice among the whole range 
of alternatives as to substance and wording. It is "proposal" in the 
most fully substantial sense, where the proposer controls and works 
out the content and form of the proposition. It is very doubtful 
whether the same word two lines later, in the description of the 
second alternative, ought to be taken to denote a mechanical take-
it-or-leave-it process.19 
There is a sound basis for the suggestion that article V contem-
plates a deliberative convention that would itself undertake to evalu-
ate fully a problem and propose those particular solutions that it 
deems desirable. Amendments to our national Constitution are 
chiefly matters of national concern. Consequently, all the alternatives 
should be carefully explored and debated on a national level, and 
the details of any proposed amendments fully worked out on a 
national level, before they are sent to the states for the more locally 
oriented ratification procedure. It can reasonably be assumed that 
the two modes provided for "proposing" amendments found in 
article V were to be symmetrical in this regard. Whether "proposed" 
by Congress or a convention, the subject matter of any suggested 
amendment should be "considered as a problem, with [an evalua-
tion of] a wide range of possible solutions and an opportunity to 
raise and discuss them all in a body with national responsibility and 
adequately flexible power."20 The "Convention" contemplated by 
article V was, therefore, to be a fully deliberative body-with power 
to propose to the states as amendments any solutions to the problem 
submitted to it that it deemed best. 
If this be so, the resolutions under consideration should be 
deemed insufficient applications within the meaning of article V and 
should not empower Congress to call a convention. Instead of re-
questing such a deliberative convention, these resolutions demand 
"a convention for the purpose of proposing the following article 
as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States."21 This 
19. Black, supra note 13, at 962 (emphasis in original). 
20. Id. at 963. Brickfield disagrees. He notes that "State legislatures can limit a 
convention to the consideration of specific amendments." BRICKFIELD, supra note IO, 
at 25 (emphasis added). 
21. See text accompanying note 16 supra. 
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is, in effect, a call for a convention empowered solely to approve or 
disapprove in a mechanical way the text of specific amendments that 
have already been "proposed" -that is, deliberated-elsewhere. In 
a sense, th1s would seek to make the convention part of the ratifying 
process, rather than part of the deliberative process for proposing 
constitutional amendments.22 These resolutions, then, are materially 
defective for purposes of article V because of their failure to request 
an article V convention.23 Lest this construction of article V be 
deemed too confining, it should be pointed out that were the states 
to demand the kind of fully deliberative convention contemplated by 
the Constitution, this would not preclude their submission of 
specific proposals to that body for its consideration. 
Furthermore, Congress has no authority to treat these resolutions 
as applications for the kind of convention article V does contem-
plate. It cannot be realistically inferred from these resolutions that 
the state legislatures tendering them would be satisfied or willing to 
have a plenary convention consider the problems at which these 
amendments were directed and submit to the states the solutions to 
those problems that the convention deemed best. Would they be 
willing to have a plenary and unfettered convention consider how 
much authority state legislatures should have over their apportion-
ment? Even if such a convention might propose that the "one man-
one vote" principle be stringently applied and expressly written into 
the federal Constitution? "It is not for Congress to guess whether a 
state which asks for one kind of 'convention' wants the other as a 
second choice. Altogether different political considerations might 
govern. "24 
Senator Dirksen, however, notes that the Constitution is silent as 
to the form of the application for a convention. "Since State legis-
latures must initiate [applications], under article V ... [their form] 
is a matter for them to determine. All that is needed, by a rule of 
reason, is a clear expression of intent by the legislatures. So what 
difference does it make in what form the application for a conven-
tion is made?"25 The distinguished Senator is undoubtedly correct. 
However, the propriety of his conclusion that the current applica-
22. Shanahan, Proposed Constitutional Amendments: They Will Strengthen Fed-
eral-State Relations, 49 A.B.A.J. 631, 633 (1963). He specifically notes that the purpose 
of including the actual text amendments was to insure that the "applicants" for a 
convention retained control over the amendments ultimately proposed. 
23. See 113 CONG. REc. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Ken-
nedy to the same effect). 
24. Black, supra note 13, at 964. 
25. 113 CONG. REc. S.5463 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Dirksen). 
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tions are therefore legally sufficient to trigger the convention process 
is dependent upon the nature of the legislative intent we are looking 
for. The present resolutions are inadequate precisely because the 
clear intent of the state legislatures in requesting a nondeliberative 
convention is the wrong intent for article V purposes. Surely Senator 
Dirksen is not suggesting that, in the face of the clear and unam-
biguous language of the resolutions demanding a convention simply 
to approve or disapprove a preselected specific amendment, Congress 
could properly find a request for a fully deliberative convention 
which would consider the general problem as a whole and propose 
its own independent solution to the states.26 If he is, the Senator 
seems to be ignoring the long tradition of honoring, in the absence 
of linguistic ambiguities, the plain meaning of a statute's language.27 
Even the legislative history-usually resorted to only as a means of 
resolving ambiguities on the face of a statute and not to impeach 
those things clearly settled by its language28-is directly in opposition 
to any assumption that the creators of these state resolutions were 
requesting a deliberative convention of the type contemplated by 
article V.29 
Most of the state resolutions contain another defect which may 
preclude their characterization as valid article V applications. Those 
which follow the format sponsored by the Council of State Govern-
ments specify that the amendment is to be ratified by the state 
legislatures.30 But article V clearly indicates that regardless of the 
mode of an amendment's proposal, Congress is to decide whether it 
shall be ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures or three-
fourths of the special ratifying conventions held in each state.31 
Arguably, then, these resolutions may also be insufficient as article V 
applications because they achieve an illegitimate end: they seek to 
prevent Congress from exercising its constitutionally-based discre-
26. It has been suggested that a state application for a convention requesting a 
specific amendment can be counted as a valid application, although the petition's re• 
quest for a specific amendment would have no binding effect on the convention. Sec 
Wheeler, Is a Constitutional Convention Impending?, 21 !LL. L. R.Ev. 782, 795 (1927). 
See also .AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 22. 
27. See, e.g., Thompson v. Siratt, 95 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1938); Equitable Life Assur-
ance Sec'y v. Bowers, 87 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1937); Hutton v. Phillips, 70 A.2d 15 (Del. 
Super. 1949); 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 316, 334-36 (3d ed. 1943). 
28. See authorities cited in note 27 supra. 
29. See Oberst, supra note 4; Shanahan, supra note 22. 
30. Amending the Constitution To Strengthen the States in the Federal System, 
supra note 4, at 11-14; Yadlosky, supra note 16. 
31. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931). 
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tion to choose the mode of ratification of proposed constitutional 
amendments. 
C. The Role of State Governors in the Application Process 
The Council of State Governments specified that the application 
it sponsored "should be in whatever technical form the state employs 
for a single resolution of both houses of the legislature which does 
not require the Governor to approve or veto."32 Applications spon-
sored by Senator Dirksen have taken the same approach. The pro-
priety of this view depends upon whether the term "legislature" in 
the application provision of article V means the whole legislative 
process of the state-as defined in the state constitution-or only 
its representative lawmaking body. 
Hawke v. Smith, No. 133 interpreted "legislatures" in the ratifi-
cation clause of article V to mean the representative lawmaking body 
only, since "ratification by a State of a constitutional amendment is 
not an act of legislation within the proper sense of the word."34 If 
the term "legislature" is so interpreted in the ratification clause of 
article V, no valid reason appears why it should not bear the same 
meaning in the application clauses of that provision. 
Additional support for the view that the governor of a state need 
not sign its application for an article V convention can be gleaned 
from the case of Hollingsworth v. Virginia.35 It was argued in that 
case that the eleventh amendment was invalid because, after it had 
been approved for proposal to the states by a two-thirds vote of 
Congress, it had not been tendered to the President for his signature 
and thus was never properly submitted to the states for their ratifi-
cation. Justice Chase answered that "the negative of the President 
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation; he has nothing to 
do with the proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitu-
32. Amending the Constitution To Strengthen the States in the Federal System, 
supra note 4, at 11. 
33. 253 U.S. 221 (1920). That case held that a state could not restrict the ratifying 
power of its legislature by providing for a binding popular referendum on the ques-
tion. 
34. Id. at 229. As a result, the Court held that a state constitutional provision that 
provided for a referendum on the action of the General Assembly in ratifying any 
proposed amendment to the United States Constitution was in conflict with article V. 
Contra, State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 181 P. 920 (1919). An approach 
similar to that of Hawke v. Smith, No. 1 has been taken by state courts with regard 
to state constitutional amendments. See Mitchell v. Hopper, 153 Ark. 515, 241 S.W. 10 
(1922); Larkin v. Gronna, 69 N.D. 234, 285 N.W. 59 (1939). 
35. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). 
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tion."86 It is not difficult to apply this reasoning to the powers of state 
governors and conclude similarly that the executive of the state has 
no function to perform in the article V application process. This is 
the position of the Ervin Bill.87 
It can also be argued that when state legislatures petition Con-
gress for an article V convention they act not as lawmakers under 
their state constitution but rather as agents of the federal govern-
ment performing a federal function. That is, they are acting as 
"representatives of the people of the State under the power granted 
by article V. The article therefore imports a function different 
from that of lawmaker and renders inapplicable the conditions which 
usually attach to the making of State laws."38 The governor's ap-
proval of an application for a convention is thus unnecessary and 
his veto may be disregarded. Effective applications for an article V 
convention need only be approved by a state's legislature.30 In 
this respect, the underlying theory upon which the applications spon-
sored by Senator Dirksen and the Council of State Governments 
are based is correct. 
D. Timing of the Applications for a Convention 
A question has been raised as to whether the thirty-two applica-
tions for a convention are "sufficiently contemporaneous to be treated 
as a valid reflection of the will of the people at any one time."40 
Congress is neither empowered nor under a duty to call an article V 
convention unless it receives "relatively contemporaneously," proper 
applications from the required number of state legislatures. The 
reason for this is that each step in the amending process is meant to 
demonstrate significant agreement among the people of this country 
-at one time-that changes in some particular part or the whole of 
36. Id. at 381. "The most reasonable view would seem to be that the signature of 
the chief executive of a State is no more essential to complete the action of the legis• 
lature upon an amendment to the Federal Constitution than is that of the President 
of the United States to complete the action of Congress in proposing such an amend-
ment." H. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. DURING 
THE FIRST CENTURY OF !Ts HISTORY, H.R. Doc. No. 353, pt. 2, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 298 
(1897). 
37. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. 
L. REv. 896 (1968). 
38. BRICKFIELD, supra note 10, at 10-11. 
39. See STAFF OF HOUSE COM?.{. ON THE JUDICIARY, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., PRODLEl\lS 
RELATING TO THE STATE APPUCATION FOR A CONVENTION To PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL TAX RATES 7-8 (Comm. Print 1952); Note, supra note 10, at 
1075. 
40. 113 CONG, REc. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy). 
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our fundamental law are desirable. Nothing less would seem accept-
able in a process of such significance and lasting impact. 
Analogous cases accord with this reasoning. In Dillon v. Gloss41 
the Supreme Court sustained the power of Congress to fix the time 
period during which ratification of a pending amendment could be 
effective. Noting that article Vis silent on this question, the Court 
asked: "What then is the reasonable inference or implication? Is it 
that ratification may be had at any time, as within a few years, a 
century or even a longer period; or that it must be had within some 
reasonable period which Congress is left free to define?"42 After 
admitting that neither the debates in the Convention of 1787 nor 
those in the state ratifying conventions shed any light on this ques-
tion, the Court concluded that "the fair inference or implication from 
Article V is that the ratification must be within some reasonable 
time after proposal, which Congress is free to fix."43 The Court's 
rationale was 
[A]s ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the 
people and is to be effective when had in three-fourths of the States, 
there is a fair implication that it must be sufficiently contemporane-
ous in that number of States to reflect the will of the people in all 
sections at relatively the same period, which of course ratification 
scattered through a long series of years would not do.44 
This logic would seem equally compelling in regard to the process 
of proposing amendments. Article V is silent as to how long applica-
tions for a convention are to retain their vitality. But here too it 
seems that to exhibit any significant or meaningful agreement as to 
the desirability of such a convention, applications from two-thirds of 
the states must be "sufficiently contemporaneous ... to reflect the 
will of the people in ... [different] sections at relatively the same 
period." In other words, "[t]o be obligatory upon Congress, the 
applications of the states should be reasonably contemporaneous 
with one another, for only then would they be persuasive of a real 
consensus of opinion throughout the nation for holding a conven-
tion .... "411 
While Dillon v. Gloss46 seems to establish the authority of Con-
41. 256 U.S. 368 (1921). 
42, Id. at 371. 
43. Id. at 375. 
44. Id. 
45. Corwin 8e Ramsey, supra note 13, at 195-96. See also .AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN-
STITUTE, supra note 16, at 24; BRICKFIELD, supra note 10, at 38-39. 
46. 256 U.S. 368 (1921). 
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gress to fix reasonable time limitations it does not solve the problem 
of what should be considered sufficient contemporaneity in the 
absence of such a prior stipulation. How, then, should Congress de-
termine whether tendered applications are sufficiently contempo-
raneous to be counted together? When do applications become stale? 
"Is the 90th Congress required to recognize resolutions set to the 
89th Congress? Are state resolutions passed more than two years ago 
... still valid?"47 
It has been suggested that the current Congress might only con-
sider those applications submitted during its tenure.48 That is, in 
order to ascertain whether it is empowered or under an obligation 
to call an article V convention, each Congress need only look to those 
applications tendered during its life. The Ninetieth Congress need 
not consider any applications tendered during the Eighty-ninth Con-
gress, since the life of an application is only as long as the particular 
Congress to which it is tendered. This standard of contemporaneity 
seems unacceptable for a variety of reasons. In the first place, ten 
applications tendered the last day of one Congress, and thirty sub-
mitted the first day of the following one would be insufficient even 
though they may have been submitted only three months apart. Ad-
ditionally, it should be recalled that the state legislatures do not 
address their applications to any specific Congress. 
Another suggestion has been that only those applications tendered 
within the present generation be counted with each other; that is, 
that the effective life of an application not exceed a generation.49 
It may be noted that no measure of the precise length of a generation 
is provided. Nor is any satisfactory rationale offered to justify Con-
gress' counting applications together that have been tendered over 
such an appreciable time period. Furthermore, convention calls made 
as long ago as twenty-five or thirty years, if that be a generation,50 
have no realistic relation to the present wishes of the current body 
politic. 
Congress might determine the effective life of an application by 
engaging in an in-depth analysis of the application itself and all 
47. 113 CONG, REc. S.5029 (daily ed. April 13, 1967) (remarks of Senator Javits). 
48. Sprague, Shall We Have a Federal Constitutional Convention, and What Shall 
It Do'!, 3 MAINE L. REv. 115, 123 (1910). The author admits that as a practical matter 
such a requirement of contemporaneity would render the application process incapable 
of fulfillment. 
49. ORFIELD, supra note 10, at 42, 
50. "Generation" is defined as "the term of years, roughly 80 among human beings, 
accepted as the average period between the birth of parents and the birth of their 
offspring." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF nm ENGLISH LANGUAGE 590 (1966). 
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surrounding circumstances. Precedent for this flexible approach to 
timeliness exists in the ratification process. In determining what is 
a reasonable time for ratification of a proposed amendment, the 
courts have stressed the continuing responsiveness of the proposal to 
the public will. "[A]n alteration of the Constitution proposed today 
has relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and . . . if 
not ratified while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it 
ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, 
unless a second time proposed by Congress."51 Consequently, an 
amendment's ratification has been considered timely only when a 
full analysis of the situation would show that the proposal is not 
stale. For example, in Coleman v. 111.iller the Court noted: 
When a proposed amendment springs from a conception of eco-
nomic needs, it would be necessary ... to consider the economic con-
ditions prevailing in the country, [and] whether these had so far 
changed since the submission as to make the proposal no longer 
responsive to the conception which inspired it .... [This question] 
can be decided by the Congress with the full knowledge and appre-
ciation ascribed to the national legislature of the political, social 
and economic conditions which have prevailed during the period 
since the submission of the amendment.52 
If this approach were to be utilized in determining the effective 
life of an application, Congress would have to decide, after examina-
tion of all the facts, whether the particular application still "has re-
lation to the sentiment and felt needs of today."53 Among the factors 
that might be considered are the political tenor of the times, then 
and now; intervening or changing circumstances relevant to the 
subject matter of the application since its filing; the transitory or 
long-term nature of the problem to which the application for a con-
vention addresses itself; whether the problem is still considered grave 
by most Americans; and so on. The obvious difficulty with this 
approach is that it requires Congress to make a determination based 
on many variables that are unusually difficult, if not impossible, for 
even that politically oriented body to evaluate properly and fairly. 
However, it can be done. 
Applying this approach to the current situation, Senators Tyd-
ings and Robert Kennedy make a very persuasive argument for 
51. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921) [quoting J. JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTIONS § 585 (4th ed. 1887)]. 
52. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939). 
53. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921) [quoting J. JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTIONS § 585 (4th ed. 1887)]. 
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presently ignoring, on grounds of staleness, most of the state appli-
cations. They suggest that: 
Congress must determine when the identical acts of various States 
will cease to be collectively responsive to a continuing public inter-
est. In this particular case, over two-thirds of the [thirty-two J enacting 
legislatures were faced with reapportionment at the time they acted 
and most of these legislatures have since changed in composition 
and outlook. 54 
[T]he reapportionment of State legislatures which had submitted 
petitions to avoid such reapportionment is a political and social 
condition which has "so far changed since the submission-of 
the petitions-as to make the proposal no longer responsive to the 
conception which inspired it." ... It is not the lapse of time, but 
rather the lapse of the malapportioned legislatures themselves which 
clearly indicated that the same "sentiment" in the newly apportioned 
legislatures may not "fairly be supposed to exist." These petitions, 
therefore, "ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted 
upon, unless a second time proposed" by a constitutionally appor-
tioned State legislature.55 
This analysis seems correct. The fact that a large number of the 
legislatures requesting an article V convention for this purpose were 
malapportioned at the time of their application and have subse-
quently been more equitably apportioned on the basis of population 
is the very kind of consideration that is relevant to the timeliness of 
such petitions according to the in-depth analysis approach. Reap-
portionment of these bodies on an exclusively population basis 
changes their composition and outlook on the subject of reapportion-
ment and probably precludes the assumption-absent new evidence 
to the contrary-that they support the efforts of their predecessors to 
permit nonpopulation-based representation. Any application for an 
article V convention to propose the Dirksen amendment which was 
tendered to Congress by a state legislature which has subsequently 
been reapportioned on a more representative population basis should, 
therefore, be rejected as stale. It cannot fairly be deemed to reflect 
that state's current legislative sentiment. On this basis, fourteen to 
seventeen of the thirty-two applications under examination here 
should be entirely ignored.56 
54. 113 CONG. R.Ec. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy). 
55. 113 CoNG. R.Ec. S.5452 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
56. See 113 CONG. R.Ec. S.5457-58 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) for a chart showing the 
number of legislatures that have been reapportioned since the submission of their 
applications for a convention. According to that chart, fourteen states had, as of that 
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Senator Dirksen rejects this and insists that none of the applica-
tions in question here are stale. He notes that "[t]he point has been 
made ... that these applications are invalid, because they date back, 
in some instances, to 1963. I think the Supreme Court demolished 
that argument pretty well in connection with the 17th Amendment." 
The Senator points out that the Supreme Court held the seven-year 
time period set by Congress for the seventeenth amendment's ratifi-
cation reasonable and proper. "If 7 years is reasonable for ratifica-
tion, is 4 years an unreasonable time in which to initiate, by State 
application, a convention for the purpose of amending the same 
Constitution to which they have 7 years to approve an amendment? 
I submit that the rule of reason applies in every case."57 
The rule of reason may well apply but it also dictates, according 
to the Goleman v. 111iller approach, a fair examination of all factors 
bearing on the continuing vitality of the several applications, includ-
ing the highly relevant change in circumstances noted by Senators 
Tydings and Kennedy. Senator Dirksen's argument may only indi-
cate that article V applications received within a period of seven 
years could normally be considered by Congress as contemporaneous 
for purposes of calling a convention. However, if there is direct and 
substantial evidence, as there is here, that relevant conditions have 
so changed during the seven-year period as clearly to suggest the 
probability that at least some of the applications tendered four or 
five years ago are stale-that is, unresponsive to the present wishes 
of the people's representatives--then Congress cannot properly 
count them. 
It is possible to devise a simpler and perhaps more sensible ap-
proach to the question of reasonable contemporaneity and timeli-
ness of applications than those already discussed. In counting 
applications for an article V convention, Congress should properly 
consider only those tendered in that period, prior to the most 
recent application, during which all of the state legislatures have had 
an opportunity to consider the question at a full regular session. 
That is, the maximum time between those applications that can be 
counted together should not exceed that period during which all 
state legislatures have met once for a full regular session. In no 
case could the time period involved exceed two and one-half years.58 
date, reapportioned their legislatures since filing an application for a convention on 
this subject. Several additional petitioning legislatures have since been reapportioned. 
57. 11!1 CoNG. REc. S.5463 (daily ed. April 19, 1967). 
58. If legislature A. made such an application at the very start of its session, say in 
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If this approach were used here, a large portion of the state resolu-
tions seeking a convention to propose the Dirksen amendment would 
be considered stale and no longer effective.1m 
The policy advantage of this approach to timeliness of applica-
tions seems evident. The burden should always be on those who 
invoke the convention process to demonstrate clearly, by sufficient 
contemporaneity of their applications, that there is a present agree-
ment among two-thirds of the states as to the desirability of a con-
stitutional convention. This consensus can be realistically demon-
strated only by limiting the count of such applications to those 
made during the most recent period during which all state legisla-
tures have had a reasonable opportunity to consider the question. 
Only applications filed during this period accurately represent the 
results of the most recent poll that could reasonably be taken on the 
subject. 
There are other advantages to this approach. Once applications 
for a convention are filed, attempts to withdraw them are not likely 
to be strenuously pressed. This would be true even though the legis-
lature had changed its mind-or would no longer make such an 
application as a de novo proposition.60 The proposed approach 
would force reasonably frequent reconsideration of the desirability 
of such a convention in each state that had previously applied for 
one. Some assurance is thereby provided that such an extraordinary 
body will be convened only if applications from two-thirds of the 
states clearly demonstrate by the most recent, hence most reliable 
poll practicable, a present agreement on the subject. 
This standard is neither unduly onerous, nor necessarily destruc-
tive of the application process. States generally will not act alone in 
such matters. Indeed, the Founding Fathers probably contemplated 
some concert of action in such attempts to obtain a convention. The 
February 1967, it would remain valid until the end of the next full regular session 
of all the state legislatures. Since many states meet only once every other year, and one 
of those might make such an application at the end of its session, for example, as late as 
June or July 1969, a period of two and one-half years may elapse between the first and 
last applications that may be counted together. 
59. Most of the states tendering applications on this subject did so in 1963 and 
1965. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 11-15; YADLOSKY, supra note 
16. Those tendered during 1965 would have expired by this standard at the close of 
the 1967 state legislatures. Those tendered in 1963, of course, would have expired 
earlier. See note 58 supra. 
60. But note that in a good number of cases, states have attempted to rescind ap• 
plications for an article V convention that they had previously tendered. Graham, The 
Role of the State in Proposing Constitutional Amendments, 49 A.B.A.J. 1181-82 (app.) 
(1963). 
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present effort is an excellent example. Furthermore, once a state 
legislature tenders such an application it can continually renew that 
application in its subsequent sessions. If there really is substantial 
continuing agreement on the desirability of such a convention, de-
bate on subsequent renewals of the state applications should be 
relatively perfunctory, and the renewals easy to obtain. Constitution-
ally speaking, therefore, the view of timeliness urged here seems 
sound and worthy of adoption by Congress. 
However, despite the inferiority of such an approach, it should 
be noted that Congress may well treat the problem of contem-
poraneity in the application process in the same way it has treated 
that problem in the ratification process, since the situations are ad-
mittedly analogous.61 In four of the last seven amendments proposed 
by Congress, it specified that the states were to have up to seven years 
to ratify them. 62 Our national legislature has also deemed all of the 
nventy-four amendments to the Constitution properly ratified within 
a time period it thought sufficiently short to demonstrate a con-
temporaneous agreement among the people in three-fourths of the 
states, despite the fact that one took four years from the date of its 
submission and another three and one-half years. 63 
A test of contemporaneity as stringent as that suggested here has, 
then, previously been rejected by Congress in one portion of the 
amending process. However, in light of its express action in four of 
the last seven amendments it submitted to the states, Congress may be 
inclined to consider seven years the absolute maximum period allow-
able to demonstrate a "current" agreement among the people. If this 
is so, proponents of the apportionment amendment will have to 
secure the endorsement of proper resolutions by the legislatures of 
two-thirds of the states within that period. In this connection it 
should be noted that Senator Ervin's bill, which originally stated 
that an application "shall remain effective for six calendar years after 
the date it is received by the Congress," now has been amended to 
61. It might be contended that applications for a convention need not be made 
contemporaneously to be effective because the calling of a convention empowered only 
to propose amendments is far less significant than ratification. But this notion should 
be rejected. All parts of the amending process are too important to demand anything 
less than the kind of contemporaneous agreement suggested here. 
62. U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII, XX, XXI, XXII. See also Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 
368 (1921). 
63. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 47-48, 54 (Corwin ed. 
1952). The sixteenth amendment was proposed July 12, 1909, and ratification was com-
pleted on February 3, 1913, while the twenty-second amendment was proposed on 
March 24, 1947, and ratification was completed on February 27, 1951. 
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provide for a four-year application life.64 It is at least possible that, 
even if Congress adopted such a specific time period as long as seven, 
six, or four years, applications tendered during such a period might 
be treated as merely entitled to a presumption of timeliness, absent 
evidence to the contrary. 
E. Right of States To Withdraw Their Applications 
May a state legislature withdraw its application for a convention 
if it subsequently changes its mind? It has been argued that under 
article V only forward steps can be taken and that therefore a state 
cannot effectively withdraw an application for a convention.06 This 
view seems entirely erroneous and untenable. It would base the 
presence of a sufficient number of applications solely upon a me-
chanical process of addition and ignore the extent to which each 
application reflects the existence of the requisite contemporaneous 
agreement. As one commentator noted, the requirement that appli-
cations be contemporaneous is inconsistent with the view that they 
may not withdraw their applications prior to the submission of the 
same by two-thirds of the states. 
[I]f States were not permitted to rescind their application ... [the] 
requirement [that they be contemporaneous] would not, in truth and 
in fact be met, since the general sentiment for a convention could 
not be said to exist in the necessary two-thirds of the States when one 
or more of those States are attempting to withdraw their applica-
tions.66 
Consequently, in determining whether two-thirds of the states have 
applied for a convention, applications which have been rescinded 
should be disregarded;67 they no longer evidence any present intent 
that a convention should be called. Senator Ervin's proposed statute 
takes the same position and provides that: 
A State may rescind its application calling for a constitutional con-
vention by adopting and transmitting to the Congress a resolution 
64. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. L, 
R.Ev. 896, 897-98 (1968). 
65. Note, Rescinding Memorialization Resolutions, 30 Cm.-KENT. L. R.Ev. 339 (1952). 
66. C. BRICKFIELD, STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 
PROBLEMS RELATING TO A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 46 (Comm. Print 1957). 
67. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, SPECIAL ANALYSIS, A CONVENTION To AMEND 
THE CONSTITUTION? 32-33 (1967); Fensterwald, Constitutional Law: The States and the 
Amending Process-A Reply, 46 A.B.A.J. 717, 719 (1960); Grinnel, Petitioning Congress 
for a Convention: Cannot a State Change Its Mind?, 45 A.B.A.J. 1165 (1959); Note, 
Proposing Amendments to the United States Constitution by Convention, 70 HAR.v. L. 
R.Ev. 1067, 1071 (1957). Contra, Packard, Constitutional Law: The States and the 
Amending Process, 45 A.B.A.J. 161 (1959). 
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of rescission in conformity with the procedure specified ... [earlier 
in this statute] except that no such rescission shall be effective as to 
any valid application made for a constitutional convention upon 
any subject after the date on which two-thirds or more of the State 
legislatures have valid applications pending before the Congress 
seeking amendments on the same subject.68 
Precedents that deny states the right to rescind their ratifications 
of interstate compacts69 or constitutional amendments70 are not 
apposite here. Ratification is the final act by which sovereign bodies 
confirm a legal or political agreement arrived at by their agents.71 
Applications for a constitutional convention, however, are merely 
formal requests by state legislatures to Congress, requesting the 
latter to "call a Convention for proposing Amendments" because 
there is a present consensus that such action is desirable. Conse-
quently, they do not share the dignity or finality of ratifications 
which might justify the latter's irrevocable nature.72 In this connec-
tion it should be noted that state legislatures seem to have been of 
the opinion that subsequent withdrawal of their applications would 
be both permissible and effective.73 The action of any state legis-
lature in rescinding its application for a convention to propose the 
Dirksen amendment should, therefore, be fully effective. 
F. Counting Applications: The Requirement of Receipt 
by Congress and Like Subject Matter 
As noted earlier, four of the thirty-two states making application 
for a constitutional convention have not formally tendered their 
petitions to Congress as such. Two of these petitions appear in the 
Congressional Record, inserted there by members of Congress who 
presumably received them from their home state's legislature.74 The 
other two are not in the Congressional Record, but at least one of 
68. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. 
L. REv. 896, 897-98 (1968). 
69. See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951). 
70. There is precedent for congressional refusal to permit a state to withdraw its 
ratification. Congress did so during Reconstruction when several states attempted to 
withdraw their ratification of the post-Civil War amendments. The decision of Con-
gress in that case seems clearly wrong, but its action may be attributed to the unusual 
temper of the times. See Clark, The Supreme Court and the Amending Process, 39 VA. 
L. REv. 621, 624-26 (1953); Grinnel, supra note 67, at ll65. 
71. Fensterwald, supra note 67, at 719. 
72. The common sense of article V, however, would seem to be that ratifications 
can also be effectively rescinded anytime before three-fourths of the states lend their 
assent to the proposed amendment. But see note 70 supra. 
73. 13RICKFIELD, supra note 66, at 46, 96. 
74. lll CONG. REc. 12853 (1965) (New Hampshire); Ill CONG. REc. 4320 (1965) 
(Utah). 
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them was transmitted to the state's congressmen.75 The question 
presented is whether these applications for a convention can, irre-
spective of their other attributes, properly be counted in light of the 
fact that they were never formally submitted to Congress. 
Some persons contend that these four resolutions just described 
may not be counted because "they have not been validly submitted 
to Congress." 
[These] resolutions were passed by legislatures which then adjourned 
without taking the final step of formally sending their petitions to 
Congress--a step which would appear to be required if there is to 
be any orderly way of determining whether a sufficient number of 
States have validly requested the calling of a convention. These 
resolutions thus have the status of unfinished legislative business at 
the State level. Their ability to be considered by Congress expired 
when the enacting legislatures expired. Until and unless these resolu-
tions are reenacted, they cannot serve as the basis on which this or 
any future Congress can call a constitutional convention.76 
While this argument has some force, it is ultimately unpersuasive. 
Actual physical submission of the application to the Speaker or 
Clerk of the House and the President or Secretary of the Senate is 
no formal part of the state legislative process. That process ends and 
is complete with the final adoption of the state resolution according 
to the rules and procedures of the state legislature.77 Consequently, 
the required intent of the state legislature for purposes of article V 
is fully, adequately, and formally expressed when all the legislative 
requisites are fulfilled. What remains is only the actual communica-
tion to Congress of the application. The precise manner in which 
that communication is accomplished does not seem to be of large 
constitutional significance if there is some means of easily verifying 
the existence and authenticity of such a legislative resolution. As 
one commentator noted: 
Advocates of the proposed convention point out that Congress has 
not enacted any law for the guidance of state legislatures in com-
municating applications for a convention to the Congress; that the 
adoption of such applications is a matter of public record, and that 
the essential question is not whether copies were submitted to the 
75. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 67, at 15-16 (Georgia and Colorado). 
See id. at 16, n.l. 
76. 113 CONG. REc. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy). 
77. State applications must be valid legislative resolutions on this subject accord-
ing to state law. See S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1967) (amended bill). See also 
Forkosch, The Alternative Amending Clause in Article T': Reflections and Suggestions, 
51 MINN. L. REv. 1053, 1057-58 (1967). 
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proper officers of the Congress, but whether they were in fact 
adopted.78 
The point is that failure to tender the form.al written applica-
tions to Congress should be considered, at most, harmless procedural 
error in a situation like the present one where there is no statutorily 
designated special repository for such applications. Absent a statute 
on the subject, why should the means of communication reflect on 
the validity of a petition? Of course, it would be tidy and probably 
desirable to settle the matter by statute, as Senator Ervin's bill 
does, 70 in order to avoid confusion and regularize the procedure. 
But absent statutory regularization, Congress should take "official 
notice" of known and verified official state actions of this sort, even 
though they have not been officially received by the appropriate 
congressional authorities.8° Congress has done this in other types 
of situations,81 and should not hesitate to do so in the present case.82 
In any event, even if the word "Application" in article V should 
be deemed to imply a direct written communication from the state 
legislature to the Congress, absent statutes to the contrary, the sub-
mission of those applications to the state's congressional delegation 
should be deemed sufficient.83 
Another factor to be considered in counting the state applica-
78. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 67, at 17. 
79. Within thirty days after the adoption by the legislature of a State of a resolu-
tion to apply for the calling of a constitutional convention, the secretary of state 
of the State, or if there be no such officer, the person who is charged by the State 
law with such function, shall transmit to the Congress of the United States two 
copies of the application, one addressed to the President of the Senate, and one 
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. • •• [The application must] be 
accompanied by a certificate ••• certifying that the application accurately sets 
forth the text of the resolution. 
S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4(a), 4(b)(3) (1967) (amended bill) (the original bill set 
a time limit of sixty days); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. L. REv. 896-97 (1968). 
80. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 67, at 17. Contra, Forkosch, supra 
note 77, at 1059-60. 
81. RULES AND MANUAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 459, 86th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 80, § 236 (1960): "Freshman members of the U.S. House are allowed to 
take their seats in cases where the credentials are delayed or lost and there is no doubt 
of the election or where the governor of a state has declined to give credentials to a 
person whose election was undoubted and uncontested." 
82. Presumably, any application for an article V convention contained in a prop-
erly adopted state legislative resolution is a part of the legislative acts of the state, a 
certified copy of which can easily be obtained from the appropriate state official. 
83. By the Rules of the United States House of Representatives, members having 
petitions to present may do so by delivering them to the Clerk and the petition will 
be entered on the Journal and in the Congressional Record. RULES AND l\fANuAL OF 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 459, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 441-43 (1961); 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 916 (N. Small &: L. Jayson ed. 
1964). Should the failure of a state's members of Congress to do their duty frustrate 
the state's application? 
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tions relates to the identity of the issues requested to be dealt with 
in convention. If, as assumed here, article V contemplates applica-
tions for a plenary convention which would propose to the states 
its own solution to a particular problem, rather than one to approve 
or disapprove the states' solution, such a convention could lawfully 
be convened only when there are a sufficient number of proper ap-
plications requesting a convention to solve the same problem or 
deal with the same issue.84 That is, Congress may not properly call 
an article V convention unless a sufficient number of appropriate 
and timely applications agree on the problem or general subject 
that such a body should consider. Many of the same reasons ad-
vanced for the proposition that applications must be reasonably 
contemporaneous apply here also. Sufficient national agreement to 
warrant the calling of a convention is evidenced only if the legis-
latures of two-thirds of the states agree that a convention is needed 
to deal with the same problem or subject matter. But the state peti-
tions need not otherwise be identical. One commentator noted in 
this connection that "Congress would have to determine whether 
the language of State applications seeking an amendment on a spe-
cific subject should be identical in their texts, or whether applica-
tions using varying language but appertaining to the same subject 
matter generally would be acceptable. Clearly the latter method is 
preferable."85 However, it is equally clear that disparate state ap-
plications seeking a convention to solve different issues or problems 
cannot be properly counted together because they do not demon-
strate any consensus. 
There will always, of course, be some difficulty in characterizing 
the scope of the issue, problem, or subject matter for these purposes. 
It can be persuasively argued, if one draws the issue or subject mat-
ter limitation realistically, that some of the current applications can-
84. If applications for approval or disapproval of a particular amendment were 
proper, only petitions demanding proposal to the states of amendments which were 
identical, at least in substance, can be counted together because only they agree on 
and ask for the same convention. 
85. BRICKFIELD, supra note 66, at 20-21 [citing Corwin &: Ramsey, The Constitu-
tional Law of Constitutional Amendment, 26 NOTRE DAME LAw. 185, 194 (1951)]. It is 
sufficient if the specific constitutional changes suggested by each application concern 
the same general subject matter; it is not necessary that each application be identical 
or propose similar changes in that subject matter. See STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 82D CONG., 2o SESS., PROBLEMS RELATING TO STATE APPLICATIONS FOR A CON· 
VENTION To PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF FEDERAL TAX RATES 15 (Comm. 
Print 1952); Corwin &: Ramsey, supra, at 195-96; Note, supra note 69. But see L. OR-
FIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 42 (1942); Wheeler, Is a Constitutional 
Convention Impending?, 21 Iu.. L. REv. 782, 795 (1927). 
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not be counted together because they desire convention considera-
tion and solution of different and disparate issues. As Senator Rob-
ert Kennedy recently noted: 
Twenty-nine of them request a convention to pass an amendment 
permitting one house in a bicameral legislature to be malapportioned. 
The other three seek only to abrogate the power of the Federal 
judiciary to deal with apportionment. 
We are told that these two groups of resolutions can be linked 
together. But certainly that cannot be. One group wants the judiciary 
stripped of jurisdiction and left without power to deal with mal-
apportionment in either chamber of a State legislature. There is no 
basis on which Congress can conclude that that group also wants an 
amendment which leaves power in the courts and sanctions malap-
portionment in only one house of a bicameral legislature. Those 
legislatures which may have believed it ·wrong for the Federal courts 
to enter the "political thicket" at all may not have wanted to guar-
antee the right of each State to malapportion one branch of its 
legislature. A request to shift power from one level to another in 
the Federal system is not the same as a request for permission to 
deny majority rule in a State legislature.86 
In fact, many states which first requested a convention to propose 
an amendment excluding the federal courts from reviewing the con-
stitutionality of state legislative apportionment later felt compelled 
to issue new calls for a convention to consider an amendment per-
mitting state legislatures to apportion one or both of their houses 
on a nonpopulation basis. "It therefore appears that even request-
ing States themselves do not believe that all the convention calls 
which have been made on the reapportionment issue can be 'stacked 
up' to reach the required 34."87 
Pushing the identity of subject matter requirement a bit fur-
ther, Congress may not even be justified in counting together all 
of the first group of twenty-nine convention applications referred 
to by Senator Kennedy. Some of those request a convention to ap-
prove an amendment which would only permit state legislatures, 
under certain circumstances, to apportion one of their houses on 
a basis other than population; others would permit that and also 
permit the state to determine on a completely unfettered basis 
"how membership of governing bodies of its subordinate [ or local 
government] units shall be apportioned.''88 Can it be said with any 
86. 113 CONG. REc. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy). 
See also 113 CONG. REc. S.5453 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
87. 113 CoNG. REc. S.4232 (daily ed. March 22, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
See also Ill! CONG. REc. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy). 
88. See, e.g., applications tendered to the Eighty-ninth Congress by Arizona, 
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complete confidence that an application for a convention to pro-
pose an amendment concerning state power over the apportionment 
of its state legislature necessarily means that its maker also desires, 
or would consent to, a convention to propose an amendment on the 
subject of state power over the apportionment of its local govern-
ment units? 
Also, several of those twenty-nine applications call for a conven-
tion-proposed amendment to assure unfettered state freedom to 
apportion both houses of their legislatures. Most others follow the 
Dirksen amendment which would permit this only as to one house.89 
Nevertheless, these two groups might be counted together in deter-
mining the number of applications for a plenary convention to solve 
a certain problem or issue. They have similar though not identical 
objectives and deal with the same problem or subject-the extent 
to which the states should have power over their legislatures' appor-
tionment. 
G. The Validity of Applications From Malapportioned Legislatures 
"Should Congress [automatically] regard as invalid petitions from 
malapportioned legislatures calling for a constitutional amendment 
to authorize malapportionment?"00 Senator Tydings, among others, 
has opined that "26 of the 32 resolutions were invalidly enacted 
[and hence should be ignored] since that many legislatures were mal-
apportioned when they passed these petitions."91 The argument is 
that "[£]or Congress to accept such petitions would be like permit-
ting all Democrats to have two votes in a referendum to determine 
whether or not Democrats should have two votes."92 Elaborating on 
this theme, the Senator argues that malapportioned legislatures ap-
plying for a constitutional amendment to perpetuate their illegiti-
mate status do not have "clean hands" and, therefore, their petitions 
Arkansas, Florida, and Idaho, contained in E. YADLOSKY, STATE PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS 
TO CONGRESS ON THE SUBJECT OF .APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE REPORT JK140C-32/205R (to Aug. 5, 1965). 
89. See, e.g., applications tendered to the Eighty-ninth Congress by Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, and Arkansas contained in YADLOSKY, supra note 88. 
90. 113 CoNG. REc. S.5451 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings) 
(emphasis added). This is a different question from that considered previously in sec-
tion I.D., "Timing of the Applications for a Convention." There, one of the issues was 
the continued validity of a state application tendered by a malapportioned legislature 
in light of that body's subsequent apportionment on a more popular basis. 
91. 113 CONG. REc. S.5455. See also 113 CONG. REc. S.5457-58 for a table listing 
twenty-six states whose applications were enacted by malapportioned legislatures. 
92. 113 CONG. REc. S.4209 (daily ed. March 22, 1967) (remarks of Senator Proxmire). 
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for a convention on this subject should be ignored. It may be con-
ceded, he says, that a "malapportioned legislature may be competent, 
pending its reapportionment, to pass legislation generally. But such 
a legislature has no competence to initiate amendments to the Con-
stitution to make legal its own illegality."93 
Senator Tydings' argument is superficially attractive. The acts 
of malapportioned state legislatures are usually considered valid 
even if they appear to favor the over-represented interests.94 Any 
other result "would produce chaos.''95 However, an improperly ap-
portioned legislature may not be considered as equivalent to one 
properly apportioned for all purposes. Certain types of action which 
are within the capability of a de jure legislature may not be worthy 
of respect when engaged in by a body that is only de facto. The 
danger of validating certain kinds of acts performed by a malappor-
tioned legislature may outweigh the danger created by the tempo-
rary lack of any body capable of acting on the subject. Acts "which 
flagrantly violate the citizens' right to equal representation and 
which even after reapportionment cannot readily be corrected"96 
may well be in this category. So, in Petuskey v. Rampton91 a federal 
district court stated that "well-known general principles of equity re-
quire that the ... [ unconstitutionally apportioned] Legislature not 
consider or vote upon any proposal to amend the Constitution of the 
United States on the subject of legislative reapportionment."98 The 
dangers of a contrary rule are apparent. If their actions on this sub-
ject were given effect, malapportioned legislatures might be able to 
stall reapportioning themselves on the basis of population long enough 
to enable them to amend the Constitution and legalize their malap-
portionment. 99 
93. 113 CONG. R.Ec. S.5452 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
See also 113 CoNG. REc. S.5455 (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy); 113 CONG. R.Ec. S.4232 
(daily ed. March 22, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
94. Ryan v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir. 1963). See also 113 CONG. R.Ec. 
S.5451 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings), 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. 243 F. Supp. 365 (D. Utah 1965). 
98. Id. at 374. 
99. 113 CONG. R.Ec. S.5452 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
Of course this is exactly what has happened. The effort to call a constitutional con-
vention is a product of this approach, made manifest in several contexts. Consider, for 
example, the following comment by a federal judge: 
It is interesting to note the speed by which the last [Utah] State Legislature me-
morialized Congress • • . to call a constitutional convention to provide for reap-
portionment "on factors other than population," which resolutions the State Senate 
passed on the tenth day of the session, compared to the Legislature's hesitancy to 
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In Toombs v. Fortson100 a federal district court enjoined a mal-
apportioned state legislature "from placing on the ballot . . . until 
the General Assembly is reapportioned in accordance with consti-
tutional standards, the question whether a constitutional amend-
ment [proposed by the malapportioned legislature and] purport-
ing to amend the present state constitution by substituting an 
entirely new constitution therefor shall be adopted.''101 The Su-
preme Court vacated this decree and remanded the case "for recon-
sideration of the desirability and need for the on-going injunction" 
in light of the election of new legislators since entry of the decree 
and the stipulation of the parties originally requesting the injunc-
tion that the case was now moot on that point.102 As the dissent 
noted, this disposition indicated approval by the Supreme Court 
of the lower court's injunction.103 
Some Civil War era cases are also relevant here. As a rule, the 
official actions of the de facto but not de jure Confederate state 
governments were recognized as valid.104 However, efforts of those 
governments that were directed toward the perpetuation of the very 
things that made them de facto rather than de jure were deemed 
void. For example, bonds issued in aid of their prosecution of the 
war against the United States were held unenforceable.lOls The 
analogies and prior discussion, then, might justify recognition of a 
narrow rule invalidating any action of a malapportioned state legis-
lature which would directly perpetuate or allow the continuance of 
its unrepresentative condition. If the rule were otherwise, these 
bodies would have within their grasp the unfettered authority to 
render secure £or all time their presently unconstitutional condition. 
This argument is certainly persuasive when applied to a mal-
apportioned state legislature's attempt to ratify a proposed con-
properly reapportion under the mandate of this court, which action occurred on 
the final (sixtieth) day of the session. 
Petuskey v. Rampton, 243 F. Supp. 365, 373 n.10 (D. Utah 1965). 
100. 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated in part and remanded, 379 U.S. 621 
(1965). 
101. Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621, 621-22 (1965), vacating in part and remand-
ing 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962). 
102. Id. at 622. It was allegedly moot due to the unclear intentions of the new 
legislature. 
103. Id. at 627, 637-39. 
104. See Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U.S. 388, 393-404 (1898); Johnson v. Atlantic, Gulf 
&: West India Transit Co., 156 U.S. 618 (1895); Ketchum v. Buckley, 99 U.S. 188 (1878); 
Hom v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 570 (1873). 
105. See Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U.S. 388, 393-402 (1898); Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S. 
452 (1884); Sprott v. United States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459 (1874); Hom v. Lockhart, 84 
U.S. (17 Wall.) 570 (1873); Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) I (1868). 
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stitutional amendment which would legitimate its present condi-
tion;106 but it seems unpersuasive as to convention applications. 
Indeed, recognition of the latter is less dangerous or injurious to 
democratic principle than acceptance of a malapportioned legis-
lature's run-of-the-mill legislation, which is uniformly treated as 
binding law. When we treat the usual acts of a malapportioned 
state legislature as binding, we permit an illegitimate body to de-
termine, on its own say-so, the rules by which we live and order 
our lives, liberty, and property. If we accept petitions from mal-
apportioned state legislatures as valid applications for an article 
V convention, we only permit illegitimate power to authorize Con-
gress to initiate or trigger a process which is constituted and oper-
ated wholly independently of that illegitimate power. Furthermore, 
the actions of that process will directly affect our lives, liberty, or 
property only after its product is ratified by three-quarters of the 
state legislatures.107 
It is, therefore, difficult to see why the act of a malapportioned 
legislature in applying for an article V convention on the subject 
of state legislative apportionment should be treated any differently 
in terms of its lawful effect than the normal run-of-the-mill legis-
lation such a body creates.108 An application of this sort does not 
enable the improperly apportioned body tendering it to preserve 
its own power or to control or influence the only process which 
can do so. 
In this connection, a statement by Justice Harlan about the 
initiation of constitutional change on the state level should be 
noted: 
I can find nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment, elsewhere in the 
Constitution, or in any decision of this Court which requires a State 
to initiate complete or partial constitutional change only by some 
method in which every voice in the voting population is given an 
opportunity to express itself. Can there be the slightest constitutional 
doubt that a State may lodge the power to initiate constitutional 
changes in any select body it pleases, such as a committee of the legis-
lature, a group of constitutional lawyers, or even a "malapportioned" 
legislature-particularly one whose composition was considered, prior 
106. Only properly apportioned legislatures can ratify such an amendment. Wolf, 
An Antireapportionment Amendment: Can It Be Legally Ratified?, 52 A.B.A.J. 326, 
327 (1966). The fact that three-fourths of the states must approve is irrelevant since 
that is written into the Constitution and must, therefore, be accepted as a basic part 
of our social compact. 
107. See Forkosch, supra note 77, at 1056-57. 
108. U.S. CoNsr. art. V. See also note 106 supra. 
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to this Court's reapportionment prouncements of June 15, 1964, to 
be entirely and solely a matter of state concern?109 
Justice Harlan's position seems sound. It may not be unreasonable 
to permit a minority of the population to trigger the amendment 
process so long as control over the process itself remains with the 
majority. Empowering a minority to trigger the process may even be 
advantageous in that it assures them democratic consideration of 
their grievances. 
Toombs v. Fortson110 is not in conflict with this view. It recog-
nized the vital distinction between according validity to actions of 
a malapportioned legislature which are a substantive part of the 
amending process and validating those which merely trigger the 
process. The court order in Toombs expressly refrained from inter-
fering with the legislature's power to trigger the amending process 
by calling a popularly elected and properly apportioned conven-
tion which could itself draft a new constitution.111 That order only 
prohibited the malapportioned legislature from submitting to the 
people a new constitution that it had drafted. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND ITS PRODUCT 
A. Must Congress Call a Convention? 
If the requisite number and type of proper article V applica-
tions are tendered to Congress within a "reasonable" time of each 
other, is Congress under an absolute obligation to call a constitu-
tional convention or can it refuse on the grounds, for example, 
that such a body is not really necessary or desirable? Article V 
states: "On the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the 
several States [Congress] shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments." From this language alone it would seem clear that 
Congress was intended to be under a firm and nondiscretionary 
obligation to call a convention when sufficient applications from 
two-thirds of the states are tendered. The word "shall" as used in 
article V is clearly mandatory. 
Other evidence also supports this conclusion. The debates in 
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 indicate that, in fact, the 
109. Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621, 626 (1965). 
llO. 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated in part and remanded, 379 U.S. 621 
(1965). 
Ill. Id. at 258-59. 
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primary purpose of the convention method was to afford a means 
of proposing amendments when the people were confronted by a 
Congress opposed to the change.112 It is obvious that to permit con-
gressional discretion here would be to defeat this purpose. Hamil-
ton, writing in The Federalist, made the following comment: 
By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged "on 
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states ... to call 
a convention for proposing amendments. . . ." The words of this 
article are peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention." 
Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body.113 
Other contemporary evidence is in accord. For example, one dele-
gate to the North Carolina ratifying convention explained the pro-
vision of article V under discussion here by noting "that it is very 
evident that ... [the proposal of amendments] did not depend 
on the will of Congress; for . . . the legislatures of two-thirds of 
the States were authorized to make applications for calling a con-
vention to propose amendments, and, on such application, it is 
provided that Congress shall call such convention, so that they will 
have no option."114 It therefore seems clear that if Congress re-
ceives within a "reasonable" time period, proper applications for 
an article V convention to deal with a certain subject from two-
thirds of the state legislatures, it is absolutely bound to convene 
such a body.ms 
112. When final debate on article V began in the Constitutional Convention, the 
draft being considered provided that "the Congress, whenever two thirds of both 
Houses shall deem necessary, or on the applications of two thirds of the Legislatures 
of the several States shall propose amendments to this Constitution • • • ." 2 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTlTUTION 629 (M. Farrand ed. 1937). 
"Col. Mason thought the plan of amending the Constitution exceptionable &: dan-
gerous. As the proposing of amendments is in both the modes to depend, in the first, 
immediately, and in the second, ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the proper 
kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the government should become oppres-
sive •••• " Id. at 629. As a result, Mr. Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Gerry moved to 
amend the article to require a convention or application of two-thirds of the states. 
"Mr. Madison did not see why Congress would not be as much bound to propose 
amendments applied for by two thirds of the States as to call a call [sic] a Convention 
on the like application.'' Id. at 629-30. 
113. THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 546 (Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton). 
114. IV J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTlTUTION 178 (2d ed. 1937). 
115. See I w. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 331 
(2d ed. 1929); Forkosch, supra note 77, at 1062-67; Packard, Legal Facets of the Income 
Tax Rate Limitation Program, 30 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 128, 133-34 (1952); Sorensen, The 
Quiet Campaign To Rewrite the Constitution, SAT. REv., July 15, 1967, at 17-18; Tuller, 
A Convention To Amend the Constitution, 193 N. AMER. REv. 369, 375-78 (1911); Note, 
supra note 67, at 1067 (1957). Contra, Platz, Article V of the Federal Constitution, 
8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 17, 44 (1934). 
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B. Improper Convention Calls, Improper Refusals To Summon 
a Convention, and the Judiciary: A Brief Note 
At the behest of a proper litigant may the judiciary independently 
determine the adequacy, timeliness, and validity of the state petitions 
for an article V convention and either (1) enjoin the operation of 
such a convention if it has been improperly called and void its 
product or (2) force Congress to summon such a body if Congress has 
improperly refused to do so? The court's authority to afford the one 
remedy seems coextensive with the other since a decision on a single 
legal issue is involved in both cases: the sufficiency of the state ap-
plications for purposes of an article V convention call. If a court 
undertakes to decide that issue at all, it must be prepared to imple-
ment its decision by affording the one remedy or the other, as the 
case requires. 
It has been suggested that the courts can and should decide the 
constitutionality of the procedures involved in any effort to amend 
our fundamental law so long as such questions are presented in 
suits othenvise properly before them. The point is made that "the 
Constitution does not expressly or impliedly except the amending 
process from the judicial power of the federal courts."116 Further-
more, if "orderly procedure," legitimated through the process of 
judicial review, "is essential in the enactment of ordinary statutes, 
should it not be even more so as to the adoption of important and 
permanent constitutional amendments?"117 Substantial Supreme 
Court precedent supports this view and indicates that at least some 
of the procedural questions which may arise in the amending pro-
cess can be settled on the merits by the judiciary.118 Failure to com• 
116. ORFIELD, supra note 85, at 21 n.51; Quarles, Amendments to the Federal 
Constitution, 26 A.B.A.J. 617 (1940). 
117. ORFIELD, supra note 85, at 21. 
118. See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) (Congress may choose ratifica-
tion by state legislatures rather than by conventions, even if the amendment should 
enlarge federal powers at the expense of "powers reserved to the people" by the tenth 
amendment); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (the states cannot exclude or restrict 
the power of their legislatures to ratify amendments to the federal constitution); 
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (Congress, in proposing an amendment to the Con-
stitution, may fix a reasonable time for ratification); National Prohibition Cases, 253 
U.S. 350 (1920) (proposal by two-thirds of both houses of Congress requires only the 
assent of two-thirds of the members present as long as these constitute a quorum to 
do business); Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (the states may not submit 
the ratification decision to a popular referendum); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (the President does not participate in the proposal of an amend-
ment). Note that all these decisions on the merits went against the challengers. In 
addition, "state courts have frequently and by the great weight of authority held that 
they may pass upon the validity of the procedure of amending the state constitutions, 
even though there be no express basis therefor." ORFIELD, supra note 85, at 20-21. See 
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ply with the constitutional procedures, including those involved in 
the convening of any article V convention, may result, then, in a 
finding that an amendment was not properly proposed or adopted 
and is therefore invalid.119 Indeed, at the behest of a proper litigant 
a court might even enjoin the election of delegates to any improperly 
called convention. 
Similarly, it has been contended that a congressional failure to 
call an article V convention when the prerequisites for summoning 
such a body have been met can be upset in the courts. That is, in 
a proper suit Congress can be compelled to summon an article V 
convention if it is legally bound to do so. The theory is that since 
calling the convention is a ministerial act, the courts may force 
Congress to do its duty.120 Recent Supreme Court cases dealing with 
state legislative apportionment are said to support this view.121 If 
the courts can force state legislatures to follow the Constitution and 
properly apportion themselves, they could and would make Congress 
perform its duty under article V. 
On the other hand, it can be argued with great force that the 
central issue in both these situations-the sufficiency of the resolu-
tions for article V purposes-is a nonjusticiable political question,122 
the resolution of which is committed exclusively and finally to Con-
gress. Consequently, the judicial branch may not interfere affirma-
tively or negatively to implement its own views as to the propriety 
of congressional action in calling or refusing to call a convention.123 
generally id. at 12-22, for cases holding that the validity of the procedures utilized in 
the adoption of a state constitutional amendment is justiciable. 
119. The courts will adjudicate on the merits the validity of a constitutional 
amendment in light of some alleged procedural defects that may have vitiated its 
proper proposal or adoption. See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); National Pro-
hibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Hol-
lingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). But see Maryland Petition Comm. 
v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. l\:fd. 1967), holding that whether the fourteenth 
amendment had been properly proposed and ratified was a nonjusticiable political 
question. See also United States v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Ky. 1954); Heintz v. 
Bd. of Educ., 213 Md. 340, 131 A.2d 869 (1957) holding the same way. 
120. Cuvillier, Shall We Revise the Constitution?, 77 FORUM 321, 323-25 (1927); 
Packard, Constitutional Law: The States and the Amending Process, 45 A.B.A.J. 161 
(1959); Packard, Legal Facets of the Income Tax Rate Limitation Program, 30 Cm.-
KENT L. REv. 128 (1952); Tuller, supra note ll5, at 379-81. 
121. 113 CoNG. REc. S.6654-55 (daily ed. May IO, 1967) (remarks of Senator Hruska). 
122. See Wheeler, supra note 85, at 791-92; Note, Proposing Amendments to the 
United States Constitution by Convention, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1067, 1071 (1957). 
123. See also S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5(c), 6(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin 
appx., 66 MICH. L. REv. 896, 898 (1968). Although the original Ervin bill deferred to 
the state legislatures on the validity of the adoption procedure, new § 3(b) provides 
that "[q]uestions concerning the State legislative procedure and the validity of the 
adoption of a State resolution cognizable under this Act shall be determinable by the 
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While there is no case directly on point, the dicta of four justices 
of the Court in Coleman v. Miller124 should be recalled: "Undivided 
control of [the amending] process has been given by ... Article [V] 
exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is 'polit-
ical' in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes 
part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, 
control or interference at any point."125 A number of more recent 
lower court cases are in accord.126 
Persuasive arguments favor the view that questions arising in 
the amending process are nonjusticiable. The most important of 
these rests upon the notion that in our democracy the practice of 
judicial review is not a necessary deduction from the language of 
the Constitution. Rather, it is a "practical condition upon its suc-
cessful operation" which inevitably conflicts with the basic postulate 
of majority rule.127 Even viewing judicial review as a desirable 
"sober second thought of the community," calculated to perpetuate 
our adherence to higher principles,128 does not completely ration-
alize the process with democratic theory; that reconciliation occurs 
only if the people can ultimately put an absolute brake upon the 
courts' elaboration of our basic societal principles.129 The most last-
ing and directly effective way for the people to do this is by amend-
ing the Constitution. Consequently, there may be some special sense 
in suggesting that the judiciary refrain from interfering as a deci-
sion maker in the only process by which the body politic can directly 
overturn what it considers to be erroneous judgments of nonelective 
courts interpreting the overriding national values upon which our 
society rests. 
It is one thing for the Court to strike down ... [a particular] Law 
as incompatible with its choice of constitutional values, and it is 
difficult enough to square this with democratic principle, but it 
would seem to be quite a different matter if the Court could, by a 
narrow interpretation of the amendment procedures, prevent the 
Congress of the United States and its decisions thereon shall be binding on all others, 
including State and Federal courts." 
124. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
125. Id. at 459 (1939) (concurring opinion). 
126. See, e.g., Maryland Petition Comm. v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. Md. 1967); 
United States v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Ky. 1954); Heintz v. Board of Educ., 
213 Md. 340, 131 A.2d 869 (1957). 
127. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 13-15 (1958). Contra, H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, 
PoUTICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 3-15 (1961). 
128. A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 26 (1962) [quoting Stone, The 
Common Law in the United States, 50 HAR.v. L. REv. 4, 25 (1936)]. 
129. Id. at 258. 
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ratification of ... [an] amendment which was intended to overrule 
... [one or more of its decisions respecting the meaning of our 
fundamental law.] Of course, the amendment process is itself gov-
erned by the Constitution, and it is by no means inconceivable that 
an amendment might be unconstitutional. But this seems to be one 
instance in which the Court cannot assume responsibility for saying 
"what the law is" without, at the same time, undermining the 
legitimacy of its power to say so. I do not find it paradoxical to 
insist that judicial review in a democracy remains defensible only 
to the extent that the Court itself will be defenseless against the 
processes through which the community may assert and enforce its 
own considered understanding of its basic code.130 
For this reason, a judicial effort to enjoin the calling of an article 
V convention or to void any proposal it made because the applica-
tions upon which that convention was based were inadequate, in-
valid, or untimely would be at war with the proper role of the 
judiciary in our system. 
Furthermore, there may be a "textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of [this particular] issue to a coordinate political 
department."131 That is, since article V states that Congress is to 
call a convention on receipt of the proper number of article V ap-
plications, it may intend that Congress be the final judge of their 
validity in all respects. This reading of article V is reinforced by the 
fact that the organization and make-up of the convention is not 
specified in the Constitution, but is instead left to the political dis-
cretion of Congress. If Congress was not to be the final judge of the 
sufficiency of convention applications, why vest it with such a large 
discretion which, as will be noted shortly, would effectively disable 
the courts from forcing Congress to do its duty? 
By the same token, it can be argued that the validity of state 
applications for an article V convention is nonjusticiable because 
of "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion [of the question] without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government."132 It is relevant in this connec-
tion to recall that the courts have never issued an injunction or 
writ of mandamus directly against the President or Congress be-
cause of the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the Con-
stitution and the consequent obligation of respect owed co-equal 
130. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 
75 YALE L.J. 517, 589 (1966). 
131. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
132. Id. 
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branches of the national government by the federal judiciary.133 To 
do so here in an effort to bar or force the calling of a convention 
would reflect a "lack of respect" for the actions of a coordinate 
branch of the federal government in regard to a subject that may 
even textually be exclusively committed to its judgment by the 
Constitution.134 
A further point should be noted with respect to the judiciary's 
incapacity in this area. The courts may not force congressional 
action as to an article V convention135 because, even reading 
prior cases relatively narrowly, certain determinations respecting 
the validity of the state applications are most certainly within 
the exclusive province of Congress. Coleman v. Miller suggests 
at the very least that the timeliness of state applications and 
their continued validity in light of attempts to withdraw them are 
nonjusticiable political questions.136 Consequently, Congress' deci-
sion on these questions will conclusively bind the courts and nec-
essarily disable them from playing any positive role in deciding 
whether a convention call is or is not warranted; for determina-
133. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867), the Supreme Court 
unanimously held that the President himself is not accountable to any court, save the 
Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, either for the nonperformance of his con-
stitutional duties or for the exceeding of his constitutional powers. "The Congress is 
the legislative branch of the government; the President is the executive department. 
Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial department; though the acts of 
both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance." Id. at 500. 
134. C. BRICKFIELD, STAFF OF HOUSE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 
PROBLEMS RELATING TO A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 27 (Comm. Print 1957), 
states: "It seems more likely, however, that the courts would refuse to issue such a 
writ [of mandamus against Congress ordering it to hold a convention] for the same 
reasons that they have refused to issue writs on the President of the United States, 
namely the doctrine of separation of powers which proscribes action by one branch of 
our government against another." See also Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354 
(D.D.C. 1967), holding that the separation of powers prevents a federal district court 
from entertaining on the merits Adam Clayton Powell's suit charging that the House 
improperly excluded him from membership in violation of the Constitution. Of course, 
if the Supreme Court reverses that decision, the argument here on the nonjusticiability 
of this issue may be weakened. 
135. 1 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 117, § 331; Fensterwald, Constitutional Law, the 
States and the Amending Process-A Reply, 46 A.B.A.J. 717, 720 (1960). Contra, 
Packard, Constitutional Law: The States and the Amending Process, 45 A.B.A.J. 161, 
196 (1959). 
136. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), held that the effectiveness of a state's 
ratification of a proposed amendment which it had previously rejected, and the period 
of time within which a state could validly ratify a proposed amendment were non-
justiciable political questions within the exclusive and irrevocable determination of 
Congress. Of course, as noted earlier, the case can be read much more broadly, and the 
dictum justifies the propriety of that latter position. See id. at 457-59 (concurring 
opinion). See Dowling, Clarifying the Amending Process, f WASH. &: LEE L. R.Ev. 215 
(1940). 
March 1968] Dirksen Amendment: Convention Route 983 
tions of the prior questions are prerequisites for any determination 
of the latter. 
Cases holding that the federal courts can force the states to re-
apportion their legislatures,137 or that they can force state legisla-
tures to draw congressional districts so that they are as nearly equal 
in population as practicable138 are inapposite here. The reason for 
this is that "it is the relationship between the judiciary and the 
coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the fed-
eral judiciary's relationship to the States which gives rise to the 
'political question.' "139 That is, "[t]he nonjusticiability of a polit-
ical question is primarily a function of the separation of powers."140 
Judicial review on the merits of state legislative apportionment or 
the drawing of congressional districts by the states only involve fed-
eral judicial superintendence of state action or inaction; but judi-
cial review of Congress' action or inaction respecting an article V 
convention directly involves the federal courts in a confrontation 
with a constitutionally co-equal branch of the federal government. 
There is another very practical reason why the legislative re-
apportionment cases are no authority for judicial intervention to 
force a convention call: The scope and nature of the decisions that 
courts must make to fashion a remedy, and their practical ability 
to implement that remedy, are not at all similar in the two con-
texts. Courts "are understandably reluctant to give orders which 
either will not be enforced or are practically unenforceable";141 
and, in the same vein they will not attempt to solve problems that 
are "in fact soluble only by a legislative solution which a court is 
totally incapable of providing."142 In the legislative apportionment 
situation, there is an existing body or model with which a court 
can tinker in minor ways to achieve its goal. To implement a re-
apportionment decree a court need only make those few adjust-
ments and alterations of an existing and functioning institution 
which are absolutely necessary to secure districts of equal popula-
tion. The situation in the present case, however, is quite different. 
If Congress refused to act after being ordered to call the con-
vention, what could a court do? Would it call the convention itself? 
On what basis would it constitute and implement the selection of 
137. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
138. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
139. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
140. Id. 
141. E. CAHN, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 39 (1954). 
142. Id. at 38. 
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such a body in light of the fact that the myriad details involved 
in the summoning of such a convention are left by the Constitution 
to the discretionary political judgment of Congress?143 Any judicial 
effort to summon a convention on its own, as a means of curing 
Congress' default, would require a court to settle de novo, and 
without benefit of any present or past convention under this Con-
stitution to guide it, such questions as the following: What should 
be the basis of the convention's apportionment of representation 
and voting power? Should the members apportioned to each state 
be elected at-large in that state or by districts? What election pro-
cedures and machinery will govern the election of convention dele-
gates and who will implement and set up that machinery? How 
many convention delegates should there be? What qualifications 
must delegates have? When and where should the convention meet? 
What procedures, if any, should bind the convention? How are its 
expenses to be paid and what shall they be? What staff, if any, shall 
the convention have? Even if these questions are answered, it is most 
doubtful that a court could ever implement its choices as to the 
composition, structure, organization, and financing of a national 
constitutional convention. Surely a court could not, for example, ap-
propriate money to finance the convention when the Constitution 
expressly vests the appropriation power exclusively in Congress.144 
But more basically, a court could not make the choices which it must 
in order to call a convention itself on any basis that would be ap-
propriate for judicial, as opposed to legislative, decision-making.14G 
As noted earlier, the legislative apportionment situation is dif-
ferent because it presents the courts with a more manageable prob-
lem. The courts are more easily able to implement any remedy 
they devise in such cases since all the rules and machinery respect-
ing the operation, financing, and election of state legislative bodies 
143. The Constitution is silent on the organization of the convention. Since Con-
gress is to call it, Congress must of necessity decide its composition. See text accompany-
ing note 153 infra. 
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 states: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, 
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." "[l]t may be observed that court 
orders, even if it could be argued that the States had a right to bring legal actions in 
the courts against an unwilling Congress to call a convention, would have little 
meaning or effect since the courts lack the necessary tools to enforce their decisions 
against the Congress." BRICKFIELD, supra note 134, at 28. See also AMERICAN ENTER· 
PRISE INSTITUTE, SPECIAL ANALYSIS, A CONVENTION To AMEND THE CONSTITUTION? 47 
(1967). 
145. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (stating that one of the hallmarks of 
a political question is the "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it"). 
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already exist and will continue to function. Political-legislative-type 
questions as numerous or broad-scoped as those discussed above need 
not be decided in that context. The court need only modify an on-
going institution with respect to one factor-its districting-in order 
to ensure that its decision will be implemented. Judicial acceptance 
of the reapportionment cases on their merits does not, therefore, 
suggest any similar capacity or ability with respect to suits attempting 
to force Congress to call a national constitutional convention. 
Consequently, Congress has a duty to call such a convention 
upon receipt of the proper number of article V applications and 
only on the receipt of the proper number of article V applications. 
But that constitutionally-imposed duty is not enforceable in the 
courts. The only remedy lies with the people at the polls. 
C. The President's Role in an Article V Convention Call 
Prior discussion of Hollingsworth v. Virginia146 suggests that the 
President's signature is not required for the valid issuance of an 
article V convention call. If this be so, the President's failure to 
join in the congressional summons of such a convention would in 
no way impair the validity of any amendment the latter body pro-
posed. The language of article V supports this conclusion since it 
asserts that "the Congress" is to call a "Convention for proposing 
Amendments" on "the Application of the legislatures of two-thirds 
of the several states." The Ervin bill likewise specifies that such a 
convention be called pursuant to a concurrent resolution which 
does not require the President's assent.147 
Nevertheless, there is no unanimity on this point, and a con-
trary argument of substantial weight has been made.148 The Con-
stitution specifically provides in article I, section 7, that: 
[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary ... shall be 
presented to the President of the United States, and before the Same 
shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by 
him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed 
in the case of a Bill. [Emphasis added.] 
146. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). This case held that the eleventh amendment was 
valid despite the fact that the President had not signed it after two-thirds of both 
Houses of Congress had agreed to submit it to the states. See text accompanying note 
28 supra. 
147. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. 
L. REV. 896, 898 (1968). 
148. Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 
YALE L.J. 957, 962-64 (1963). 
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Hollingsworth v. Virgina recognized an exception to this required 
procedure in congressional proposal of constitutional amendments. 
But it can be argued that this mode of proposing constitutional 
amendments was taken out of the veto process solely because "the 
congressional proposal must be by two-thirds in each house, [ and] 
it [therefore] may have been thought that the requirement for over-
riding the veto was already met."149 This ground would not exist 
if Congress called a constitutional convention to propose amend-
ments by a simple majority vote. It can therefore be argued that 
the commands of article I, section 7, apply to the convention call 
since it is an "Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence 
of the Senate and House of Representatives [are] ... necessary." 
If this is true, the President must sign any call by Congress for a 
constitutional convention and if he vetoes it, Congress can override 
him only by a two-thirds vote of both Houses. 
Additional support for this view can be gleaned from the fact-
to be noted shortly-that Congress must specify how the convention 
is to be chosen, its organization, rules, and so forth. This being so, 
Congress must necessarily make more than a mere "call" for a con-
vention. Such a call would be meaningless without the inclusion 
of the specific terms upon which such a body is to be constituted, 
organized, and conducted, and the inclusion of provisions for the 
precise means of implementing those terms. Legislation spelling out 
these matters would appear similar to the general kinds of legislation 
with which Congress normally deals. Consequently, no reason of logic 
dictates its different treatment in respect to the need for presidential 
approval. 
The requirement of presidential concurrence here also seems 
logical and desirable on another ground. He is the only official who 
is elected by and responsible to the American people as a whole. 
His participation in this process that would intimately affect all 
Americans and our nation as a whole seems, therefore, especially 
proper and natural. The President's duty in such a case would be 
the same as that of Congress: To participate in a call only if, in 
good conscience, he deems the constitutional requisites for such a 
convention to have been properly met. If article V demands presi-
dential concurrence in such a call, the refusal of the chief executive 
to act, like that of Congress, would probably be conclusive on the 
courts,150 subject, however, to the right of Congress to override his 
149. Id. at 965. 
150. See text following note 133 supra. 
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judgment by a two-thirds vote. Nevertheless, it should be reiterated 
that the need for presidential concurrence in any congressional 
convention call might well be decided otherwise on the basis of 
article V's specific language directing "The Congress" to call a con-
vention and the analogous case of Hollingsworth v. Virginia.151 
D. Congressional Authority Over the Convention: 
Some Organizational and Procedural Problems 
The language of article V does not expressly indicate the extent 
of Congress' authority over the organization, constitution, and pro-
cedure of the convention. Indeed, Madison worried about these 
questions at the Constitutional Convention of 1789. "He saw no 
objection ... against providing for a Convention for the purpose 
of proposing amendments, except only that difficulties might arise 
as to the form, the quorum, etc."152 Subject to constitutional limita-
tions, Congress may of course solve these problems. Under its au-
thority to call a convention, Congress has implied power to fix the 
time and place of meeting, the number of delegates, the manner 
and date of their election, their qualifications, the basis of appor-
tioning delegates, the basis for voting in convention, the vote re-
quired in convention to propose an amendment to the states, and 
the financing and staffing of the convention.153 Subsequent discus-
sion will focus on the three most important questions that need to 
be resolved in this area: the basis for apportioning delegates and 
voting power in such a convention; the means of choosing delegates; 
and the vote required for proposing an amendment to the states. 
It should be noted first that Congress' determination in the 
above matters may be conclusive on the courts for all purposes.154 
A refusal by the courts to review the constitutional merits of the 
organizational ground rules imposed by Congress on an article V 
convention might be defensible on many of the same bases noted 
earlier in connection with the discussion of judicial review and the 
application process. Nevertheless, as previously stated, some sound 
151. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). 
152. 2 Farrand, supra note 114, at 630. 
153. See BRICK.FIELD, supra note 134, at 18; L. ORFIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL 
CoNsrITUTION 43-44 (1942); Black, supra note 148, at 959; Note, supra note 122, at 
1075-76. This continuing hand of Congress in the convention process need not appear 
unduly strange since article V explicitly gives it the power to decide between modes of 
ratification regardless of the mode of proposing the amendment to the states. See also 
Note, The Constitutional Convention, Its Nature And Powers-And the Amending Pro-
cedure, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 390, 397 n.46. 
154. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
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arguments can be made to the contrary. And, even if the courts 
are conclusively bound, Congress will still be obligated on this sub-
ject to follow the Constitution. However, in that case the only avail-
able remedy for congressional abuse of this obligation will be polit-
ical, resting with the electorate at the polls. 
Congress would not be justified in modeling an article V conven-
tion on the Constitutional Convention of 1787 where representa-
tion and voting were by states.155 Neither the terms of article V 
nor any past practice under our Constitution requires representa-
tion or voting in such a body to be on that basis. Furthermore, in 
1787, 
[the states] were in a position of at least nominal sovereignty, and 
were considering whether to unite. The result of the Convention 
would have bound no dissenting state or its people; the same was 
true of the acceptance of the new Constitution by the requisite nine. 
All these conditions are now reversed. We are already in an indis-
soluble union; there is a whole American people. The question in 
an amending convention now would be [only] whether innovations, 
binding on dissenters, were to be offered for ratification.156 
Consequently, the propriety of apportioning voting power and rep-
resentation by states in the 1787 Convention cannot settle the pro-
priety of similar action in a convention today. The Ervin bill, in 
its original form, ignored this distinction, providing that "[i]n vot-
ing on any question before the convention each State shall have one 
vote which shall be cast as the majority of the delegates from the 
State, present at the time, shall agree.''157 The bill, as amended fol-
lowing legislative hearings, more properly provides that each delegate 
shall have one vote. And, convention delegations under the bill 
will be weighted by population since "[a] convention called under 
this Act shall be composed of as many delegates from each State as 
it is entitled to Senators and Representatives in Congress."158 
Modeling an article V convention on the Convention of 1787 
would also have grave deficiencies from the point of view of pop-
ular representation in the amending process. Amendments proposed 
by Congress have been approved by two-thirds of the Senate repre-
senting thirty-four states, and two-thirds of the House representing 
155. M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CoNsrITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 57 
(1962). 
156. Black, supra note 148, at 964-65. 
157. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a) (1967) (original bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. 
L. REv. 896, 900 (1968). 
158. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. 
L. REv. 896, 899 (1968). Members of the House of Representatives must be apportioned 
on a population basis. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2. 
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roughly two-thirds of the nation's population. However, if a con-
temporary convention were to follow the 1787 model, so that each 
state would have one vote regardless of its population, "then thirty-
four states representing 30 per cent of the population could call the 
convention, twenty-six states representing one-sixth of the popula-
tion could propose new amendments, and thirty-eight states repre-
senting less than 40 per cent of the population could ratify them."159 
This possibility seems most undesirable. Alterations of our funda-
mental law should be, within the framework of those procedures 
expressly provided in the Constitution for amending it, subjected 
to the greatest degree of popular participation and representation 
possible. Amendments to our Constitution are, after all, changes of 
the basic social compact upon which our whole society rests. Every 
member of our society, therefore, has a very large stake in the 
amending process which justifies as wide a popular participation 
as possible. 
In any event, Congress would seem barred from apportioning 
delegates and voting power in an article V convention on a basis 
which is less representative of the popular will than it is. The re-
apportionment cases160 tell us that as a general constitutional rule 
legislative apportionments must be structured according to the prin-
ciple of "one man-one vote." Although a convention to propose 
constitutional amendments has no authority to ratify them, it is a 
vital and essential part of the legislative process. That body should, 
therefore, be deemed subject to the usual demand that representa-
tion in the statute-making process be based on population.161 Pre-
sumably, the due process clause of the fifth amendment binds the 
federal government on this subject in the same way as the states 
are bound by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.162 The only exception, of course, is that on the national level 
the federal government's obligations in this respect are modified 
by the Constitution's express provision for equal representation of 
the states in the Senate and all the ramifications attendant to that 
particular arrangement. 
Due process' insistence that representation in legislative schemes 
159. Sorensen, supra note II5, at 19, col. I. 
160. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
161. See Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated in part and 
remanded, 379 U.S. 621 (1965). 
162. Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), with Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497 (1954). See also, e.g., Harrell v. Tobriner, 36 U.S.L.W. 2283-84 (D.D.C. 
Nov. II, 1967) (holding that the fifth amendment's due process clause imposes equal 
protection requirements on the United States). 
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be based solely on population may therefore be subject to an implied 
exception which would perm.it Congress to secure symmetry, in ap-
portioning the delegates and voting power of an article V conven-
tion, with the alternative body empowered under our fundamental 
law to propose constitutional amendments. That is, the delegates 
and voting power might properly be· apportioned so that each state 
would, as the amended Ervin bill provides, have representation equal 
to its combined number of Senators and Representatives in the 
Congress. But to be consistent with the demands of due process as 
interpreted in the light of the reapportionment cases, delegates and 
voting power could never be apport.oned on a less popular basis in 
an article V convention than the representation scheme in Congress. 
The possible exception to the rule cf "one man-one vote" that may 
be applicable in this situation can be only as broad as the particular 
scheme of congressional representation written into the Constitution 
demands. 
Sound reasons suggest, however, that the apportionment of dele-
gates and voting power in a national constitutional convention can 
and should be more representative than Congress and be based solely 
on population. Values inherent in our federal system are adequately 
protected in the ratification process where each state has one vote. 
Apportionment of both delegates and voting power solely on the 
basis of population makes good sense because it would conduce to the 
most accurate expression of the national will, which ought to be the 
objective in any such convention. Cc,ngress should, therefore, appor-
tion article V convention delegates to the states solely on the basis 
of population and provide that the vote of each delegate be equally 
weighted. 
In dealing with another important aspect of convention orga-
nization the first draft of the Ervin bill provided that "[e]ach dele-
gate shall be elected or appointed in the manner provided by State 
law," but this was amended to provide that "two delegates shall be 
elected at large and one delegate shall be elected from each Con-
gressional district in the manner provided by State law."163 This is 
a wise change and happy compromise. The delegates from each state 
should be elected from districts of equal population, rather than 
elected at large within that state or appointed by the state legislature. 
Election by districts tends to assure better representation of the nu-
merous discrete and divergent interests found within each state than 
election at large. The latter scheme would give all of a state's repre-
163. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. 
L. REv. 896, 899 (1968). 
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sentation to the statewide majority interests, completely excluding 
minority interests even though they may be majorities in some parts 
of the state. If Congress, by deferring to state law, had permitted 
some states to elect their delegates to the national convention at-
large, and others to elect theirs from single-member districts of equal 
population, it may also have violated due process by analogy to some 
of the fourteenth amendment equal protection-reapportionment 
cases.164 Certain classes of electors in states selecting all their delegates 
by statewide at-large elections may be much worse off in terms of 
convention representation than electors in other states with single-
member delegate districts.165 
Moreover, direct election of convention delegates by either meth-
od is more desirable than their appointment by the legislature. Since 
the delegates will have to run on a public platform of some sort if 
they are to be elected, direct popular selection permits the people 
to express their views early in the amending process. In addition, 
because the state legislatures were sufficiently disturbed to request 
the assemblage of such a body to deal with a certain problem, it 
may be wise to insulate the selection of the convention's members 
from their influence. The more independent checks in the amend-
ing process, and the greater the number of disassociated groups that 
consider the problem, the safer and more reliable the result of this 
most important process is likely to be. And, since the people-not 
their legislatures-are sovereign, and a constitutional amendment is 
a modification of the social compact, the convention process should, 
as far as possible, be an unfiltered expression of the sovereign will. 
A third problem area has to do with the degree of convention 
approval to be required to propose an amendment. Although the 
initial Ervin draft provided that "a convention called under this 
Act may propose amendments to the Constitution by a majority 
of the total votes cast on the question," the amended version pro-
vides for "a vote of a majority of the total number of delegates to 
the convention."166 This is only a minor improvement. Congress 
should require a vote of two-thirds of the delegates to propose any 
given amendment in order to assure a symmetry of concurrence in 
164. See Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d 355 (1966) (holding 
that any scheme of legislative apportionment in which there are multi-member dis-
tricts and single member districts in the same house is, absent special circumstances, 
a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause and the state con-
stitution's uniform operation of laws clause). But see Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 
(1966) (holding to the contrary under the fourteenth amendment). 
165. See Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d 355 (1966). 
166. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § IO(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. 
L. REv. 896, 900 (1968). 
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the bodies empowered to propose constitutional amendments-
whether the body be Congress or a convention. Such symmetry 
has a virtue that is greater than token consistency; it would eliminate 
any possible forum-shopping. A two-thirds requirement in conven-
tion would also guarantee that no amendment, regardless of its means 
of proposal, is ever submitted to the states before an overwhelming 
consensus as to its desirability is evidenced in a nationally-oriented 
body. 
E. State and Congressional Authority To Limit the Convention 
If an article V convention is properly convened, can either the 
states or Congress limit the scope of its authority in any way? It 
should be recalled that the applications sponsored by Senator Dirk-
sen and the Council of State Governments attempt to restrict the 
convention to the approval or rejection of the precise amendments 
contained in those resolutions. Prior discussion has already demon-
strated that an article V convention is to be a fully deliberative 
body empowered to propose those solutions to a problem that it 
deems best. Consequently, the convention cannot be limited by the 
state applications to the approval or rejection of the text of any 
particular amendments contained therein. Nor, by the same token, 
can Congress limit the convention in this manner.167 
Some persons have contended, however, that an article V conven-
tion would operate free of any control as to subject matter from 
outside institutions: 
Pandora's Box will be opened wide. For no matter how these 
state applications are worded, no matter what limitations are given 
by the Congress on its convention call, there is no possible way by 
which such a convention can be required to confine itself to reap-
portionment or any other issue. A national Constitutional Conven-
tion, by definition, would represent the highest power in our system. 
Like its single predecessor in 1787, which had in its day been specifi-
cally told by a cautious Congress to confine itself to the "sole and 
express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation," this new 
convention could ignore any instruction, tackle any subject, and 
propose any amendments or revisions that it sees fit.168 
167. As noted earlier, Brickfield disagrees. BRICKFIELD, supra note 134, at 25. There 
is another reason why Congress cannot properly limit a convention to the approval or 
rejection of the text of any particular amendment. The framers of the Constitution 
probably intended the convention method of proposing amendments to be as free as 
possible from congressional interference so that the convention could propose any 
amendments it deemed desirable in spite of any congressional objections to the 
provision. 
168. Sorensen, The Quiet Campaign To Rewrite the Constitution, SAT. RE.v., July 
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Implicit in this view is the assumption that an article V convention 
is a direct and complete expression of the sovereign will; that once 
it is assembled, such a body is endowed with all the power residing 
in the people. Consequently, neither the states, the Constitution, 
nor any agency of the national government can limit it. The dele-
gates to such a convention are, according to this philosophy, "what 
the people of the state would be if they were congregated here in 
one mass meeting .... [They] are the State."169 So, "[w]hen the 
people of the United States meet in a constitutional convention 
there is no power to limit their action. They are greater than the 
Constitution .... "170 
The argument that an article V convention is sovereign and 
therefore beyond external control is specious. The convention is 
but a constitutional instrumentality of the people, deriving all its 
powers from article V. It is no more than a specific means expressly 
provided for in the Constitution, and governed by its terms, by 
which the people may revise their fundamental law. "While there 
may be a special dignity attaching to a convention by reason of its 
framing fundamental law, no such dignity or power should attach 
which would invest it with a primacy over [the states or] other 
branches of government having equally responsible functions [in 
the amending process.]"171 A constitutional convention is, therefore, 
distinguishable from an extra-legal or revolutionary convention. A 
revolutionary convention is an unconstitutional, hence illegitimate 
body exercising provisionally the functions of government and de-
riving its powers from revolutionary force and violence or from 
necessity. Such a convention is possessed of unlimited powers.172 On 
the other hand, a constitutional convention is, 
as its name implies, constitutional; not simply as having for its 
15, 1967, at 18. See also 113 CONG. REc. S.5458 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of 
Senator Javits) ("A constitutional convention, even if elected under a congressional 
mandate that it could deal with only one subject, could run away. After all, it would 
be a duly created constitutional convention, and it could propose any amendments 
which it decided it wished to propose, subject to ratification.'') 113 CONG. REc. S.5453 
(daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Proxmire) ("And what is to prevent the 
representatives of the states in convention assembled from deciding to do just about 
anything they please?''); 113 CONG. REc. S.5454 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of 
Senator Tydings); 113 CONG. REc. S.5462 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senators 
Proxmire and Dirksen). For the state legal precedents to this effect, see Note, The 
Constitutional Convention, Its Nature and Powers-And the Amending Procedure, 
1966 UTAH L. REV. 390, 402-03. 
169. ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 27 (1847). 
170. 46 CoNG. REc. 2769 (1911) (remarks of Senator Heyburn). 
171. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 145, at 36. 
172. J. JAMESON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 6, § 7 (1867). 
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object the framing or amending of Constitutions, but as being within, 
rather than without, the pale of the fundamental law; as ancillary 
and subservient and not hostile and paramount to it. This species 
of Convention sustains an official relation to the state, considered 
as a political organization. It is charged with a definite, and not a 
discretionary and indeterminate, function. It always acts under a 
commission, for a purpose ascertained and limited by law or by 
custom. Its principal feature, as contradistinguished from the Revolu-
tionary Convention, is, that in every step and moment of its exist-
ence, it is subaltern .... 113 
Article V contemplates a constitutional convention, not a revolu-
tionary convention. This must be so since the body is summoned 
pursuant to the terms and under the authority of that constitutional 
provision. 
Prior discussion should indicate that while neither the states nor 
Congress may limit an article V convention to consideration of the 
terms of any particular provision, either or both should be able to 
restrict such a body to the proposal of amendments dealing with the 
same general subject matter as that contained in the applications. 
Indeed, the state applications should accomplish this of their own 
force. The reason for this is that an agreement that a convention 
ought to be held is required among two-thirds of the state legislatures 
before Congress is empowered to convene such a body. No article V 
convention may be called in the absence of such a consensus. If the 
agreement contemplates a convention dealing only with a certain 
subject matter, as opposed to constitutional revision generally, then 
the convention must logically be limited to that subject matter. To 
permit such a body to propose amendments on any other subject 
would be to recognize the convention's right to go beyond that 
specific consensus which is an absolute prerequisite for its creation 
and legitimate action. 
If the state applications, of their own force, can so bind the 
convention, then Congress must disregard and refuse to transmit 
for ratification any proposed amendment which concerns a different 
subject matter. Here, as elsewhere, if the issue is deemed nonjus-
ticiable, the courts will be bound by Congress' decision on the ques-
tion. This, regardless of whether Congress deems a proposed amend-
ment ineffective because it is beyond the scope of the convention's 
authority or effective because it is within the scope of the conven-
tion's authority. On the other hand, if this question is justiciable, 
173. Id. at 10, § 11. 
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the courts may independently determine whether an amendment 
proposed by such a convention is beyond the general subject mat-
ter requested by the state applications. If such an amendment goes 
beyond the permissible subject matter bounds, the courts might 
enjoin its ratification or set the amendment aside after ratification 
because it was never properly proposed. 
The view that the states have this authority to limit a conven-
tion to the consideration of amendments dealing with the same gen-
eral subject matter as that contained in their applications is not 
widely accepted. It has been insisted that "[t]he nature of the right 
conferred upon the state legislatures in requesting Congress to call 
a constitutional convention is nothing more or less than the right 
of petition."174 In this view, the convention itself is a federal instru-
mentality set up by Congress under powers granted to it by the 
Constitution. Since article V directs Congress to call the convention 
and is silent as to the details of such a body, Congress is the only 
authority entitled to specify those details. Consequently, if any 
power can limit such a convention to the proposal of amendments 
dealing with the same subject matter as that contained in the state 
applications, it can only be Congress.176 "[S]tate legislatures ... 
have no authority to limit an instrumentality set up under the fed-
eral Constitution. . . . [T]he right of the legislatures is confined to 
applying for a convention, and any statement of purposes in their 
petitions would be irrelevant as to the scope of powers of the con-
vention."176 
So, even if the state applications cannot themselves perform 
the task, Congress at least should have the power to restrict the 
convention to the same general subject matter as that contained in 
the applications upon which it is predicated.177 This sort of restric-
tion, in fact, is essential: A convention called pursuant to a resolution 
dealing with state legislative apportionment, for example, should 
not be permitted to propose amendments concerning the treaty 
power or free speech.178 A constitutional change should never be 
174. Wheeler, Is a Constitutional Convention Impending?, 21 ILL. L. REv. 782, 795 
(1927). 
175. STAFF OF HOUSE CoM?.r, ON THE JUDICIARY, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., PROBLEMS RE-
LATING TO STATE .APPLICATIONS FOR A CONVENTION To PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA• 
TIONS OF FEDERAL TA.X RATES 15 (Comm. Print 1952). 
176. ORFIELD, supra note 153, at 45. 
177. Contra, 46 CONG. REc. 2769 (1911) (remarks of Senator Heyburn). ORFIELD, 
supra note 153, at 45; Wheeler, supra note 174, at 796; Note, Proposing Amendments 
to the United States Constitution by Convention, 70 HARV, L. REv. 1067, 1076 (1957). 
178. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., PROBLEMS 
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proposed by a convention unless two-thirds of the states have pre-
viously agreed that a convention to consider an amendment dealing 
with the particular subject matter involved is desirable (or that a 
convention is needed to consider a general constitutional revision). 
For this reason, it would seem anomalous were Congress powerless 
in this regard. Certainly Congress would be under a duty to call a 
general convention if two-thirds of the state legislatures properly ask 
for one. Equally obvious should be its right and obligation to limit 
the scope of a convention to the subject matter requested by the state 
applications. As one commentator noted in this regard: 
A convention . . . is an instrument of government and acts 
properly only when it stays within the orbit of its powers. Since the 
Congress is the branch of the Federal Government which has the 
duty of calling the convention, and since it acts at the requests of 
the States, and since both, in the final analysis, represent the people, 
the ultimate source of all power, a Federal constitutional convention, 
to act validly, would necessarily have to stay within the designated 
limits of the congressional act which called it into being . 
. . . This does not mean that the convention may not exercise its 
free will on the substantive matters before it; it means simply that 
its will shall be exercised within the framework set by the congres-
sional act calling it into being.110 
At least one state application expressly recognized that such a 
body could not validly propose amendments outside of the general 
subject matter area specified in the state resolutions and embodied 
in the congressional resolution making the convention call. Indiana's 
1957 application stated: 
It is within their ... [the states'] sovereign power to prescribe 
whether such convention shall be general or shall be limited to the 
proposal of a specified amendment or of amendments in a specified 
field; that the exercise by the sovereign States of their power to 
require the calling of such convention contemplates that the applica-
tions of the several States for such convention shall prescribe the 
scope thereof ... and that it is the duty of the Congress to call such 
convention in conformity therewith; that such convention is with-
out power to transcend, and the delegates to such convention are 
RELATING TO STATE .APPLICATIONS FOR A CONVENTION To PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS OF FEDERAL TAX RATES 15 (Comm. Print 1952); J. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS; THEIR HISTORY, POWERS AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 10, 11, 
493 (4th ed. 1887). 
179. BRicKFmLD, supra note 134, at 18. See also w. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMEND-
MENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 93 (1910) (A convention "is bound by all restrictions 
either expressly or impliedly placed upon its actions by the constitution in force at 
the time."). 
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"Without power to act except "Within, the limitations and provisions 
so prescribed.180 
With the exception of the statement regarding the states' right to 
limit such a convention "to the proposal of a specified amendment," 
the thesis of the Indiana resolution is identical to that suggested 
here. 
There is at least some judicial authority, by analogy, for the 
proposition that Congress may limit the scope of an article V conven-
tion's deliberations. State courts have on several occasions held that 
state constitutional conventions are subject to the restrictions con-
tained in the call for the convention. The theory is that the conven-
tion call promulgated by the legislature is a law and the delegates are 
elected under the terms of that law.181 Consequently, they can exer-
cise no powers beyond those conferred by such a statute or the state 
constitution. 
It seems clear, therefore, that Congress at least can limit the 
scope of any article V convention to the "subject matter" or "prob-
lem" at which the state applications were directed. Certainly Con-
gress is morally bound to do so. In any subsequent litigation, the 
courts should respect such a limitation imposed by Congress and dis-
regard any provisions proposed by a convention beyond its authority. 
Of course, the notion that the state applications can themselves limit 
the scope of a convention's authority should not be ignored. If that 
theory is rejected, however, the people of the United States will have 
to rely on Congress. 
The Ervin bill expressly adopts this approach and seems to be 
completely sound in this respect. It specifically provides that every 
delegate to an article V convention must, before taking his seat, 
"subscribe an oath not to attempt to change or alter any section, 
180. C. BRICKFIELD, supra note 134, at 25. 
181. See Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 51 (1874); Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 33 
S.E.2d 49 (1945). In the latter case the court stated at 627, 33 S.E.2d at 55: 
'Where the legislature, in the performance of its representative function, asks the 
electors if they desire a convention to amend or revise a certain part of the Con-
stitution but not the whole Constitution, an affirmative vote of the people on 
such question would have the binding effect of the people themselves limiting 
the scope of the convention to the very portion of the Constitution suggested 
to them by the legislature. The wishes of the people are supreme. Some agency 
must ascertain the desire of the people, and the legislature, by section 197, has 
been selected by them to do so. 
See also Cummings v. Beeler, 189 Tenn. 151, 223 S.W.2d 913 (1949); Note, The Con-
stitutional Convention, Its Nature and Powers-And the Amending Procedure, 1966 
UTAH L. R.Ev. 390, 403-05. But see Goodrich v. Moore, 2 Minn. 49, 53 (1858) (dictum). 
For debate on both sides of this question, see I DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION To AMEND 
THE CoNSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 1872-73, 52-61 (1873). 
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clause or article of the Constitution or propose additions thereto 
except in conformity with the concurrent resolution [of Congress] 
calling the convention."182 In addition, it provides that "[n]o con-
vention called under this Act may propose any amendment or 
amendments of a general nature different from that stated in the 
concurrent resolution [of Congress] calling the convention."183 In 
summoning the convention, Congress is to "set forth the nature of 
the amendment or amendments for the consideration of which the 
convention was called."184 Furthermore, the product of the conven-
tion's work may be disapproved by Congress for submission to the 
states for ratification "on the ground that its general nature is dif-
ferent from that stated in the concurrent resolution calling the 
convention."185 
In the end, it seems clear that an article V convention may be 
limited to the same general subject matter as that contained in the 
state applications. A runaway convention is no real danger since the 
power of the states and Congress in this regard is based on a sound 
legal and practical basis. "[T]ogether, the Congress and the State 
legislatures ... not only initiate but also finally approve the work 
of any convention. With this ultimate power at their commend 
[sic], they may fence off the boundaries of power within which a 
convention must operate."186 
F. Ratification of Convention-Proposed Amendments 
Even if an amendment on the subject of state legislative appor-
tionment could be validly proposed by a convention called pursuant 
to the resolutions in question here, Congress would not be bound by 
the resolutions' stipulation that such a proposal be ratified by the 
legislatures of three-fourths of the states. Article V clearly empowers 
Congress to determine in its sole discretion which of the two modes 
of ratification specified in that provision shall be utilized;187 this, 
regardless of the method of the particular amendment's proposal. 
Congress could, then, select either mode-"by the Legislatures of 
182. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. 
L. REv. 896, 899 (1968). 
183. Id. § lO(b). 
184. Id. § 6(a). 
185. Id. § ll(b). 
186. C. BRICKFIELD, STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., }ST SESs., 
PROBLEMS RELATING TO A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 26 (Comm. Print 1957). 
187. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931). See Forkosch, The Alternative 
Amending Clause in Article V: Reflections and Suggestions, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1053, 
1078-80 (1967). 
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three-fourths of the several states, or by Conventions in three-fourths 
thereof ... "-and that selection would be immune from alteration 
by judicial review. 
The initial Ervin bill recognized this, providing that Congress 
specify in its convention call "the manner in which such amendment 
or amendments [proposed by the convention] shall be ratified in 
accordance with article V of the Constitution."188 This approach, 
which seems desirable, was inexplicably deleted in the amended ver-
sion. If Congress does not provide for the ratification mode in the 
convention call, it might be tempted to refuse to provide for ratifica-
tion if it disliked the proposal's terms. This would be improper since 
the convention means of proposing amendments was intended to be 
independent of Congress. Indeed, it was meant to provide a route 
by which amendments could be proposed to the Constitution when 
the national legislature refused to act. "Therefore, the best time 
and place to make such a choice [respecting the means by which any 
convention proposal shall be ratified] is in the call, and thereafter 
any further congressional function should be extremely and strictly 
limited to simple procedural duties."189 
One last point should be noted with respect to the ratification of a 
proposed amendment dealing with state legislative apportionment. 
Prior discussion would support the conclusion that malapportioned 
state legislatures may not properly or validly ratify a constitutional 
amendment legitimizing legislative malapportionment.190 As noted 
previously, this conclusion is justified by analogy to the doctrine of 
"clean hands." It is also supportable because the reasons of ex-
pediency which normally justify recognition of a malapportioned 
legislature's acts are outweighed where recognition of its action 
would cause irreparable and permanent injury to those protected by 
the present constitutional requirement of one man-one vote. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The convention route to proposing constitutional amendments 
is uncharted. Many difficult questions would have to be resolved in 
any effort to utilize it. Current pressures for such a convention may 
188. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a) (1967) (original bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. 
L. REv. 896, 898 (1968). 
189. Forkosch, supra note 187, at 1079. The Ervin Bill, however, imposes the duty 
on Congress to stop the proposal's submission to the states if it is outside of the general 
subject matter submitted to the convention for its consideration. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. § ll(b) (1967) (amended bill). As noted earlier, this seems proper. 
190. See text accompanying notes 90-107 supra. See also Wolf, An Antireapportion-
ment Amendment: Can It Be Legally Ratified?, 52 A.B.A.J. 326 (1966). 
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induce the settlement of some of these questions but are unlikely to 
resolve them all. The Ervin approach, which is for Congress to enact 
a general statute on this subject, seems desirable. However, the bill's 
provisions should be modified in conformance with the suggestions 
made here. 
In any event, the efforts of the thirty-two states that have tendered 
petitions to Congress since 1962 for an article V convention seem to 
be constitutionally inadequate. Congress may call such a body only 
upon receipt of proper, valid, and timely applications from two-
thirds of the states. The petitions from these states are inadequate 
for present purposes because they do not request the plenary kind 
of convention which article V contemplates and cannot properly be 
treated as applications for this kind of convention; most of these 
applications are now stale; and, anyway, all thirty-two could not be 
added together as one group because they do not deal with the same 
subject matter. Even if two more states tender applications for a 
convention Congress should, therefore, refuse to call such a body on 
the basis of these state petitions. It seems probable that Congress' 
decisions on this matter will be given conclusive effect by the 
courts-either by avoidance as a nonjusticiable "political question," 
or on the constitutional grounds ventured herein. 
